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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Background to the study 
There is a realisation that urbanisation has overstretched the ability and efforts of central 
governments to serve from the centre, thus, giving rise to the search for a robust 
decentralisation policy that vests urban local governments with some level of autonomy.1 It is 
in this context that decentralisation has become critical in order to sufficiently respond to the 
varied service delivery challenges brought about by increasing urbanisation. However, all 
efforts to capacitate urban councils through the process of decentralisation are futile if the 
urban local governments lack the necessary financial means to fulfil their responsibilities.  
The nature and extent of fiscal autonomy enjoyed by urban councils in Zimbabwe is a matter 
of debate. The current thinking in central government is that Zimbabwean urban councils 
already have at their disposal boundless fiscal powers and that they are in a strong position to 
mobilise resources for  service delivery programmes.2 It is alleged that the assignment of any 
further fiscal autonomy to urban local governments will threaten equitable development.3 
They are of this view because equitable development calls for commitment and political will 
of the highest order.4  Other levels of government are assessed as lacking in their capacity to 
ensure equitable distribution of resources.5 On the other hand, there are those who are of the 
view that urban local governments in Zimbabwe lack fiscal autonomy. They argue for the  
assignment of more fiscal autonomy to urban local governments.6 They point to the failure of 
urban local authorities to absorb and deal with the challenges resulting from rapid 
urbanisation. In particular, they point to the huge revenue gaps as the major reason for 
obsolete infrastructure in urban areas.   
                                                             
1 Fjeldstaad  2003: 133. 
2 Ministry of Local Government  2008: 2. 
3 Ministry of Local Government  2008: 2. 
4 Ministry of Local Government  2008: 2. 
5 Ministry of Local Government  2008: 2. 
6 Ministry of Local Government  2008: 8. 
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The lack of fiscal autonomy is often cited as the reason behind  the failure by urban councils 
in Zimbabwe  to provide social goods and services to ratepayers. The overall degeneration is 
evidenced by poor roads, lack of clean water and lack of capacity to collect refuse.  
Some suggest that there is a political dimension to the  failure by central government to give 
more fiscal autonomy to urban councils. This relates to the fact that an opposition party,  
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC),  now controls all the thirty-two urban councils in 
Zimbabwe.7 The strategy used by the  ruling Zimbabwe African National Union PF (ZANU 
PF), some argue, is to undermine the urban councils such that they are denied revenue 
streams to carry out service delivery and thus expose them as unviable alternatives to ZANU 
PF councils.8 The strategy also involves withholding fiscal autonomy so that MDC urban 
local governments have to negotiate with ZANU  PF for the development and acceptance of 
new sources of revenue for all urban councils.9  
2. Statement of the problem 
As the foregoing suggests, there is no agreement regarding the level of autonomy enjoyed by 
urban councils. With the view to determine the extent to which the current system of 
decentralisation entrenches the fiscal powers and financial autonomy of the urban councils in 
Zimbabwe, the study will attempt in earnest to answer the following questions:  
 What constitutional provisions are there in place for sustaining the fiscal autonomy of 
urban councils? 
 Can urban councils identify and develop new revenue streams independent of  central 
government? 
 Is the arrangement of revenue raising powers between local government and central 
government reflective of good fiscal decentralisation policy?.  
 Do urban councils enjoy expenditure discretion? 
 How much freedom do urban local authorities have with respect to borrowing? 
 Is the legislative basis for intergovernmental fiscal transfers adequate? 
 Who determines the institutional setting within which the preceding questions are 
answered? 
                                                             
7 IDAZIM 2010: 31. 
8 Bland 2010: 8. 
9 IDAZIM 2010: 49. 
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3. Focus and objective of the study  
The research discusses how far Zimbabwe has gone in empowering urban communities by 
strengthening their urban councils and systems of sub-national government finances. The 
research will analyse legal provisions in the Zimbabwe Urban Councils Act (Chapters 29:15) 
of 199610 as they relate to the characteristics of local government financing. The study will 
also highlight the need for the Zimbabwe government to address the need for a better fiscal 
decentralisation framework which addresses the concerns of urban local governments.   
4. Significance of the research 
The thesis focuses on fiscal decentralisation in general and fiscal autonomy for urban local 
governments in particular. The thesis may assist central and urban local governments in 
Zimbabwe in identifying  contentious issues around the lack of fiscal autonomy. The 
clarification of issues of fiscal autonomy will contribute towards addressing the reasons that 
led to deteriorating service provision in all the urban towns and cities in Zimbabwe. 
5. Literature review 
Very few authors have written about fiscal decentralisation in Zimbabwe. Matongo and 
Nhemachena are of the view that while the Zimbabwe government appears keen to 
decentralise and has, in fact, decentralised some major functions, this exercise has not always 
been followed by a decentralisation of fiscal powers.11 The lack of fiscal autonomy is blamed 
for placing excessive financial burden on urban councils to the extent that service provision 
of health, education, roads and other services in general has suffered.12  
Similarly, Wekwete notes that the Zimbabwe government has been assigning new 
responsibilities to urban local governments, including health and education, without 
providing additional financial resources or fiscal powers. Such responsibilities are coming 
during a difficult  period in which the urban local governments are trying to meet growing 
service demands while unifying their inherited administrative systems based on segregated 
                                                             
10 Legislation in Zimbabwe, except for subsidiary legislation such as statutory instruments and regulations is 
identified by way of chapters and classified in accordance with the subject matter. In this regard, the Urban 
Councils Act is Vol. 15 of Chapter 29. 
11 Matongo and Nhemachena 2000: 2. 
12 Matongo and Nhemachena 2000: 15. 
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services. He further argues that if the urban local governments are to continue to operate 
effectively, they must enjoy fiscal autonomy.13  
Nyoni and Dingani make the specific point that the government of Zimbabwe has 
decentralised to urban local governments the responsibility for the provision of health 
services without providing the urban councils with the necessary revenue to cover the 
expenditures.14 They further argue that urban local governments are incurring huge deficits in 
their health accounts that have translated into serious cash flow problems in that they have 
had to finance these deficits through very expensive bank overdrafts.  
Most of the material available in Zimbabwe on decentralisation is general in nature with most 
writers choosing to commit only a few sentences or one paragraph at most on fiscal 
decentralisation much less on fiscal decentralisation for urban councils. However, those who 
have written on decentralisation make the general observation that decentralisation did not 
result in the fiscal autonomy of urban local governments in Zimbabwe.   
6. Methodology 
The fiscal decentralisation policy for urban local governments in Zimbabwe will be reviewed 
by examining books, reports, case law, regulations, the Constitution, relevant legislation, 
literature, policy papers from the Ministry of Local Government and other relevant 
documents. Electronic sources will also be used.  
7. Structure of the study 
The chapters in the study are organised as follows: 
Chapter Two introduces the subject of fiscal decentralisation. It aims to determine the nature 
and meaning of fiscal decentralisation. It will attempt to achieve this through the 
identification of the essential features of the building blocks of fiscal decentralisation. 
Whenever relevant, it will refer to the experiences of other countries on fiscal 
decentralisation.  
Chapter Three discusses salient features of fiscal decentralisation for urban councils in 
Zimbabwe from a historical perspective. The aim is to put the current local government 
                                                             
13 Wekwete 1992: 13.  
14 Nyoni and Dingani  2000: 3. 
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financing arrangements for urban councils into perspective.  It seeks to achieve its objective 
by discussing revenue, expenditure, borrowing and intergovernmental fiscal transfers in the 
context of local government financing policy from 1890 to 1996.  The Chapter attempts to 
assess from a historical perspective the trends in the financial clout of the urban local 
governments during the period 1890 to 1996. 
Chapter Four seeks to analyse the legal framework for fiscal decentralisation for urban 
councils in Zimbabwe as provided in the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15) of 1996. The 
chapter will attempt in earnest to evaluate the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by urban councils in 
Zimbabwe.  
Chapter Five concludes the study and gives few recommendations.     
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CHAPTER TWO 
INTRODUCING FISCAL DECENTRALISATION 
1. Introduction 
Chapter Two introduces the subject of fiscal decentralisation. It aims to determine the nature 
and meaning of fiscal decentralisation. It will attempt to identify the essential features of 
fiscal decentralisation. Whenever relevant, it will refer to the experiences of other countries. 
For purposes of maintaining a coherent structure, the research paper will confine itself to the 
experiences of South Africa, India and Nigeria. The constant reference to the three countries 
as examples does not in any way suggest that they practise better fiscal decentralisation. The 
idea, is rather, to use laws and practices of those countries to explain the essential features of 
fiscal decentralisation. The four aspects of fiscal decentralisation which the research paper 
will  refer to are: revenue, expenditure, borrowing and intergovernmental fiscal transfers.    
2. Fiscal decentralisation in a nutshell 
Fiscal decentralization is about the transfer of taxing and spending powers from central 
government to sub-national governments such as urban councils.15 Broadly speaking, there 
are four aspects that make up fiscal decentralisation. These are revenue, expenditure, 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers and borrowing.   
Any discussion about the revenue of urban councils is two pronged. First it raises the 
question of who between central government and urban local government should tax where 
and what.16 Second, it is compelled to answer the important question of what other revenue 
sources are assigned to urban councils.17 Another issue that is pertinent to the discussion on 
revenue is the extent of discretion sub-national governments can exercise in raising 
revenue.18   Expenditure, on the other hand, relates to the discretion of urban councils to 
commit and manage their financial resources without the interference of central government. 
                                                             
15 Fjeldstad 2003:133. 
16 UNDP  2010: 4. 
17 UNDP  2010: 4. 
18 UNDP  2010: 4. 
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Beyond the allocation of responsibilities, expenditure discretion is a good indicator of the 
commitment of central government to fiscal decentralisation.19  
An intergovernmental fiscal transfer refers to budgetary support from central government to 
urban councils for purposes of funding public services.20 Although intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers are used for a wide variety of purposes, they are mainly used to ensure: 
 “vertical” fiscal balance (providing additional resources to urban councils), so that 
there is a balance between their fiscal needs and available resources to them; 
 funding of specific national priorities; or 
 that the effects of externalities are counter-acted.21  
Finally, borrowing powers refers to authority granted by central government for an urban 
council to finalise loan arrangements with a willing financier.22 This is especially the case 
where there is glaring disparity between the expenditure and revenue of urban councils.  
There are a number of reasons why fiscal decentralisation could be adopted. It is often argued 
that fiscal decentralisation brings urban local governments closer to ratepayers in the sense 
that it establishes a direct connection between expenditure programs and community needs.23 
The context of fiscal decentralisation, it is argued, results in a situation where expenditure 
decisions are more likely to be appropriate and acceptable because they mirror the tastes of 
local communities. Another reason often put across in favour of fiscal decentralization is that 
citizens within urban local governments are likely to be more willing to contribute financially 
in support of development activities that are identified and implemented at the local level.  
Fiscal decentralisation promotes experimentation and political accountability at the local 
level. 
It is pertinent to mention that the value of fiscal decentralization is the subject of contestation 
among academics and local government practitioners. Put briefly, those firing a broad shot at 
fiscal decentralization point to the threat it poses in worsening regional disparities.24 
                                                             
19 UNDP  2010: 3. 
20 UNDP  2010: 5. 
21 UNDP  2010: 5. 
22 UNDP  2010: 6. 
23 UNDP  2010: 2. 
24 Smoke  2001: 13. 
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Specifically, they make reference to the asymmetries in service provision caused by varied 
revenue bases across urban councils.  To bolster their argument , they point to the fact that 
the poor and those with low incomes can be excluded from accessing goods and services if 
decentralisation takes the form of devolution.25 According to this view, central government is 
presented as the only credible institution that has a broad political mandate to ensure some 
degree of equity in the distribution of goods and services and sufficient political power to 
redistribute resources.26 It is also argued that fiscal decentralisation can lead to an 
intensification of local networks of corruption and the capture of expenditure programs of 
urban councils by the rich and powerful.27 It would appear that there is no such thing called 
standard fiscal decentralisation. The type of fiscal decentralisation practised in any country 
appear to be shaped by historical and political dynamics, among other variables. 
From the foregoing, it is clear that any discussion on fiscal decentralisation raises a 
significant number of key issues about the arrangement of fiscal powers and authority 
between central government and urban local authorities.  First, a key question on fiscal 
decentralisation that begs to be answered is the extent of the relative powers of central 
government and urban councils to raise revenue. Second, fiscal decentralisation need not only 
be about the question of raising revenue but also about the extent to which urban local 
governments are empowered and how much authority and control they exercise over the use 
and management of devolved financial resources. Third, fiscal decentralisation ought to be  
about the extent to which urban councils can exercise their borrowing powers without central 
government standing in their way. Fourth, it must demonstrate that central government 
support for urban councils in the form of intergovernmental financial transfers, does not lead 
to loss of autonomy.  
2.1 Revenue  
As indicated earlier, revenue is about the availability of the financial means to fulfill the 
objectives of expenditure programs of urban councils.28 The sources of revenue for urban 
local authorities include service fees, rates and fines. The presence of constitutional or 
equivalent backing for the revenue raising powers of urban councils  is one of the major 
                                                             
25 Smoke 2001: 13. 
26 Smoke  2001: 13. 
27 UNDP 2010: 2. 
28 UNDP 2010: 2. 
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indicators of good fiscal decentralisation.29 For example, in South Africa,  the fiscal powers 
of urban municipalities are encoded in the Constitution of 1996.30 The situation is different in 
India, where urban local authorities do not boast of original revenue raising powers as fiscal 
powers are assigned to urban councils at the discretion of States. Article 243 of the 
Constitution of India31 succinctly captures the subordinate nature of the revenue powers of 
urban councils. It provides that, the legislature of a State may, by law,  
           “authorise a municipality to levy, collect and appropriate such taxes,  
           duties, tolls and fees in accordance with such procedure and subject 
           to such limits; and assign to a municipality such taxes, duties, toll 
           and fees levied and collected by the State Government for such  
           purposes and subject to such conditions and limits.”  
 The revenue raising powers of urban councils in Nigeria are accorded constitutional 
protection, although the powers appear to be limited when compared with those of South 
African urban local authorities. Section 7(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria provides for the 
revenue powers of urban councils but the powers can only be exercised with the approval of 
state governments.32  
                                                             
29 UNDP 2010: 8. 
30 S 229 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa grants urban  local governments in South Africa 
fiscal authority to impose:  
(a) “rates on property and surcharges on fees for services provided by and on behalf of the municipality; and 
 (b)if authorized by national legislation, other taxes, levies and duties appropriate to local government or to the 
category of local government into which that municipality falls, but no municipality may impose income tax, 
value-added tax, sales tax or customs duty.”  
31 The Constitution of India recognises two levels of government, the Union and States. The Union is the 
equivalent of federal government. Below the Union are States. Urban local government is not recognised in the 
Constitution. It is a creature of the statute, which reports and is shaped by the States. There is no direct 
interaction between urban local governments and the Union. The interaction between urban councils and the 
Union is mediated by the States. The fiscal powers of urban councils are left to the states to determine. 
 
32 S 7 (1) of the Constitution of Nigeria reads: “The system of local government by democratically elected local 
government  councils is under this Constitution guaranteed; and accordingly, the government of  every state 
shall, subject to S 8 of this Constitution, ensure their existence under a law which provides for the finance 
……..of such councils.” The Constitution of Nigeria recognises two levels of government, the federal and state 
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The presence of sufficient revenue powers is ordinarily assessed as evidence of national 
government commitment to fiscal decentralisation.33 However, it is not enough that urban 
councils are granted taxing powers. It is also important to assess whether the taxes that are 
assigned are productive or not.34 This is not the case in South Africa where all the productive 
sources of revenue are resident with the national government.35 Examples of national sources 
of revenue are income tax, value-added tax, general sales tax, and customs duties.36 In fact, 
there appears to be no limits to national government’s taxation powers.37 On the other hand, 
urban councils are in charge of low yielding sources of revenue such as property rates and 
surcharges on fees for services.38 Similarly, the Constitution of India assigns productive and 
elastic sources of taxes such as income tax, corporation tax, customs duty to the Union.39 The 
deficiency in  taxing powers assigned urban local authorities in India left  property tax as the 
only important source of revenue for urban councils.40  Other sources of revenue such as 
taxes on the consumption, sale or supply of electricity, advertisements, non-motorised 
vehicles, theatre, milch and dogs have failed to elevate the financial positions of urban 
councils as they do not generate enough revenue.41 The case of urban councils in Nigeria is 
not different from that of South Africa and India.  In fact, the constitutional demarcation of 
revenue powers in Nigeria promotes vertical imbalances and horizontal inequities which put 
urban local authorities at a disadvantage.42 The low yielding sources of revenue which fall 
within the legal and administrative jurisdiction of urban councils in Nigeria are licenses and 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
governments.  Below the federal government are states. Urban local government is not recognised in the 
Constitution. It is a creature of the statute, which reports and is shaped by the States. There is no direct 
interaction between urban local governments and the federal government. The interaction between urban 
councils and the federal government is mediated by the states. The Constitution mentions the need for state 
governments to ensure that urban councils are financially provided but leaves the determination of the fiscal 
powers of urban councils to individual state governments. 
33 UNDP 2010: 3. 
34 Fessha 2008: 450. 
35 Stanton 2009: 176. 
36 Steytler 2007: 333. 
37 Steytler 2007: 333. 
38 Steytler 2007: 333. 
39 Mathew and Hooja  2009: 185. 
40 Mathew and Hooja  2009: 185. 
41 Mathew and Hooja  2009: 185. 
42 Galadima  2009:  251. 
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fees on television and wireless radio; market and trading licenses and fees; car park duties; 
and advertising fees.43  The assignment of marginal fiscal authority can be said to be a strong 
indicator of the low status associated with urban councils, moreso in view of the fact that they 
are creatures of statute.44  
The level of revenue discretion assigned to urban councils is an important issue. In relation to 
this, the setting of the upper limits on council charges by central government is a practice 
which is at variance with the implementation of good fiscal decentralisation.45 It is a practice 
which affirms the lower fiscal authority of urban councils. This is the situation in South 
Africa where the Ministers of Local Government and Finance decide the total revenue 
derived from rates on all property categories or how a rate on a specific category of property 
may be increased. Section 43 of the Municipal Finance Management Act of South Africa 
reinforces the inferiority of urban councils in revenue generation by determining upper limits 
of municipal tariffs and taxes. In addition, the Minister of Finance is responsible for coming 
up with the national norms and standards for imposing municipal user fees and surcharges.46  
The fiscal autonomy is eroded further by the legislative provision authorising the Minister of 
Local Government to regulate the general framework of municipal property rates.47 Similarly 
in India48 and Nigeria49 state governments prescribe frameworks for tariffs and rates for 
urban local authorities.  
The foregoing discussion has identified a few issues pertinent to revenue for urban councils. 
One of the issues identified is that the mere provision of revenue powers  in the Constitution 
is not enough. What is important is whether urban local authorities can exercise the revenue 
discretion assigned to them by the constitutional process.  Linked to this is the issue of 
whether the sources of revenue assigned urban councils are productive or not. Only when 
                                                             
43 Galadima 2009: 27. Galadima argues that the revenue sources that fall under the jurisdiction of urban councils 
are non-bouyant and inelastic. They cannot yield sufficient revenue to make any significant impact on the 
structure of local finance. In practice, only one source of tax, markets, is exploited by urban councils. 
Interestingly, even the tax source universally considered a local tax, namely property taxes and rating, is in 
reality under the legal jurisdiction of the state.  
44 Galadima  2009: 251. 
45 Zhang and Zou  1998: 221.  
46 S 8.2 (a) of the Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Act, 1997.  
47 S 83 of Municipal Property Rates Act, 2004. 
48 Mathew and Hooja 2009: 186. 
49 Galadima 2009: 253. 
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high yielding sources of revenue are availed can the process of fiscal empowerment make a 
difference to the fiscal structure of urban councils. 
2.2 Expenditure 
Good local fiscal autonomy for urban councils is often associated with the absence of a legal 
framework for regulating the financial expenditure of urban local authorities.50 More often 
than not, the expenditure discretion of urban councils is subject to national regulatory 
framework.51 For example section 215 (2) (a) of the Constitution of South Africa provides 
that  “[n]ational legislation must prescribe-(a) the form of …..municipal budgets”. 
Section 216 of the Constitution of South Africa entrenches the control of financial processes 
of urban councils. It allows for central government control by prescribing that urban councils 
introduce generally recognised accounting practice52, uniform expenditure classification53 
and uniform treasury norms54. Urban councils are threatened with withholding of 
intergovernmental transfers if  they commit a persistent or material breach of the measures 
outlined above.55 De Visser also alludes to the tight regulation of municipal expenditure, 
accounting and reporting by National Treasury.56 Similarly, the financial processes of urban 
councils in India are legislated and regulated by the State.57 For example, urban councils 
require state government clearance in order to incur expenditure beyond a certain threshold, 
exposing them as institutions of limited financial authority.58 With no independent 
expenditure powers except those assigned or shared by the state, the form of regulation of 
expenditure thresholds for urban local governments vary from state to state in India. For 
example, village panchayats (councils) in Kerala, India, can implement projects without the 
need to secure the approval of the state only if the value of the project is  RS100,000 (US$2, 
064) or below.59  In Nigeria, the regulation of urban local authorities is provided for in 
                                                             
50 UNDP 2010: 7. 
51 Stanton 2009: 177. 
52 S 216 (1) (a) of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
53 S 216 (1) (a) of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
54 S 216 (1) (a) of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
55 S 216 (2) of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
56 De Visser  2009:  283. 
57 Mathew and Hooja  2009: 188. 
58 Mathew and Hooja  2009: 189.  
59 Mathew and Hooja  2009: 189. 
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outdated financial control instruments such as those contained in the Finance (Control and 
Management) Act of 1958.60 The Act constitutes the legal bed rock upon which the urban 
council accounting manuals, treasury circulars, financial regulations and financial 
instructions are founded.61 In addition, the financial memoranda issued by states regulate the 
accounting processes, the books of accounts to be maintained and procedures to be followed 
in the preparation of accounts and financial statements.62 Perhaps the most important aspect 
of the Act is that it regulates the accounting format and the basis of accounting for urban 
local authorities.63 Further to this, the rules and guidelines issued by the state governments 
deny urban councils any expenditure discretion and in many ways do not enhance the 
capacity of those entrusted with local public funds to better manage them.64  
One of the important factors in relation to the discretion of expenditure is the nature and 
extent of post-budget controls. The existence of post-budget controls for urban councils is 
often regarded as a practice at variance with good fiscal decentralisation.65  Post-budget 
controls are systems put in place by states to monitor the budgets of urban councils which 
have already been approved.66 There are many ways of controlling budgets of urban councils. 
One way of effecting control is by limiting the expenditure discretion of urban councils.67 
Another mechanism is to constantly dispatch auditors from states to go and verify compliance 
in the expenditure programs of urban councils.68  
State governments in Nigeria regulate the financial processes of urban councils, reducing 
their autonomy  to freely commit their finances in line with local preferences. Well after 
                                                             
60 Aruwa  2005: 4. 
61 Aruwa  2005: 4. 
62 Aruwa  2005: 5. 
63 Aruwa  2005: 5. 
64Aruwa 2005: 6. The Finance (Control and Management) Act covers the following key areas in government 
accounting: the operation of funds, the external controls for operating the accounting system in terms of audit 
and investigations, and the appropriation procedure. It forms the basis for the audit powers of states. Ironically, 
the federal and state governments in Nigeria are reported to be taking their time to review the Finance (Control 
and Management) Act of 1958 despite the existence of clear evidence presented to them demonstrating how the 
Act has constrained the expenditure discretion of urban councils. 
65 Galadima 2007: 28. 
66 Zimbabwe Institute 2009: 7. 
67 Mathew and Hooja 2009:  189. 
68 Galadima 2007: 28. 
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budgets are in operation, the states in Nigeria have got mechanisms in place for imposing 
further controls on what urban councils can do.69 For example, state governors use their audit 
powers to assess the compliance of urban councils with regard to the usage of financial 
transfers. In the case of South Africa, national treasury has the powers to cause urban 
councils to furnish it with any financial information on conditional and unconditional 
grants.70 This is particularly the case where urban councils receive budgetary support from 
national government for specific projects.71  
The preceding discussion has identified a few issues. One of the issues is that expenditure 
discretion is important. Only when urban local authorities enjoy expenditure discretion are 
they in a position to link expenditure to the tastes of urban communities. Linked to this issue 
is the impact of central government control of the expenditures of urban councils. Another 
issue is the impact of central government control on the ability of urban councils to develop 
capacity for managing their own financial resources. Yet another issue is the restrictive nature 
of the constitutional and statutory provisions on expenditure control. Finally, the excessive 
monitoring of expenditure through post-budget controls is detested for the reason that it 
affirms the subordinate nature of urban councils. 
2.3 Borrowing  
The ability of urban local governments to execute borrowing powers with minimal 
interference from central government  is another phenomenon  indicative of the assignment 
of substantive fiscal powers.72 Other features that are key to the existence of a good 
environment for borrowing include the absence of norms, thresholds and state approval for 
borrowing by urban councils.73 Urban local authorities must also be a position to approach 
lending institutions of their choices and conclude loan terms without national or state 
                                                             
69 Galadima  2009: 254. 
70 National Treasury 2010: 3. 
71 The Municipal Finance Management Act, 56 of 2003 regulates revenue, expenditure, borrowing, 
intergovernmental transfers, financial reporting, budgeting, accounting and reporting of urban municipalities. 
72 UNDP  2010: 5. 
73 UNDP 2010: 5. 
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governments coming into the picture.74 It is often said that the role of central government 
should be confined to the setting of a broad framework for sub-national borrowing.75 
One of the key issues to be considered is whether there is a constitutional basis for borrowing 
by urban local governments.76 This is not always the case. For example, urban councils in 
South Africa enjoy constitutional protection to borrow.77 In India78 and Nigeria79, borrowing 
by urban councils  takes place at the behest of state governments.  A cross cutting issue for 
the urban councils in the  three countries is that the powers to borrow from external sources 
are subject to national regulation.80   
Another issue related to the discretion to borrow is the purpose for which the loan is sought. 
Often, the right to borrow for urban councils is granted under the specific condition that such 
borrowing be used for funding capital expenditure and not recurrent deficits.81 This is a 
common feature of borrowing by urban councils in South Africa, India and Nigeria. 
Borrowing for consumption is disallowed. In Nigeria, borrowing is permitted only for 
projects that will achieve economic and infrastructure development in urban councils.82 Only 
when urban local authorities have secured borrowing powers from national government are 
they in a position to source funds for capital projects from lending institutions.83 In other 
words, central government must give approval to the borrowing power application. 
From the foregoing, it is clear that urban councils are limited in how they can exercise their 
financial discretion to borrow.  An issue which is often topical is whether there is 
constitutional or statutory basis for borrowing. A related aspect is the legal provision 
                                                             
74 UNDP 2010: 5. 
75 UNDP  2010: 5. 
76 UNDP 2010: 5. 
77 S 230A (1) of Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
78 Mathew and Hooja 2009: 186. State governments in India have the flexibility to determine the framework 
within which urban councils can borrow from the market. 
79 Galadima  2009:250. Urban local authorities in Nigeria cannot borrow without the authority of the state 
government, which guarantees the debt.  
80 UNDP  2010: 2. 
81 The theme of borrowing for capital development and not recurrent expenditure is covered by many writers on 
fiscal decentralization. The theme also finds application in South Africa, India and Nigeria. In these countries 
borrowing is allowed for capital development and not recurrent expenditure. 
82 Galadima 2009: 250. 
83 UNDP 2010: 6. 
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empowering the state  to determine the outcome of the borrowing power applications of 
urban councils. Equally important is whether borrowing is allowed for both capital and 
recurrent expenditure. Yet another consideration is from which institutions borrowing is 
permitted. The last aspect of significance is the regulatory procedure for borrowing by urban 
councils. 
2.4 Intergovernmental financial transfers 
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers are considered a feature of local government policy 
financing throughout the world.84 Central government support through  grants is justified on 
the basis that there is always misalignment between assigned tasks and income sources for 
urban councils.85 The other reason is that there is always disparity in income per-capita across 
urban councils.86 The objective of transfer equalisation is to narrow down the economic 
disparities within and between urban councils.87  
In principle, there are two types of intergovernmental grants, which are conditional and 
unconditional grants.88 A conditional grant is funding received by an urban council from 
central government for a specific project. It  has prescriptions stating both the substance and 
the project outcomes of execution. The dispensing government ministry must satisfy itself 
that funding was expended according to the framework it set.89 Conversely, unconditional 
grants come with no conditions attached and urban councils are not constrained in their 
expenditure programs.90  
The existence of constitutional provisions for intergovernmental transfers is often an aspect 
associated with good fiscal decentralisation.91 Urban councils in South Africa92, India93 and 
                                                             
84 UNDP 2010: 7. 
85 UNDP 2010: 5. 
86 UNDP 2010: 8. 
87 See for example S 214 (2) (g) of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
88 Stanton  2009: 178. 
89 Galadima 2010: 28. 
90 Stanton  2009:178. 
91 UNDP 2010: 7. 
92 S 227 (1) Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
93 Mathew and Hooja 2009: 187. Article 243X of the Constitution of India provides for grants-in aid to urban 
councils from the Consolidated Fund of the State. 
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Nigeria94 enjoy constitutional protection of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Although the 
constitutional protection of intergovernmental financial transfers is commended, the question 
that begs an answer is whether the transfers are conditional or unconditional.95  Section 214 
(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa entitles urban municipalities to an 
equitable share of nationally collected revenues, with individual municipal allocations 
determined through the local government equitable share formula.  Although the impression 
created is that equitable share is unconditional, one has to look at the commitment of the 
funding to appreciate the element of conditionality built into it.96 The prescriptive nature of 
the funding is linked to the execution of nationally determined indigent policies on free basic 
water and electricity. To add salt to a festering wound, the equitable share is subject to 
national treasury regulations, creating a situation where urban councils have to increase lines 
of accountability going upwards rather than downwards. The problem with conditional grants 
is that it undermines the fiscal autonomy of urban councils in that the allocation and renewal 
of  funding is linked to the ability of the urban council complying with the terms of usage for 
the funds set by the government ministry giving out the funds.97  
Similarly, the increase in the disbursement of specific-purpose ( conditional) grants  as 
opposed to general-purpose (unconditional) grants is indicative of increased centralising 
tendencies by states and the federal governments.98 The payment in Nigeria of the block 
                                                             
94 Galadima 2007: 27. Article number 160 of the Constitution of Nigeria of 1999 provides for intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers. State and urban local governments are in terms of Article number 160 (5) of the constitution 
required to maintain “Local Government Accounts” into which the transfers are deposited. The amount of 
money credited to the “Local Government Account” of an urban council is distributed on such terms and in such 
a manner as may be prescribed by the House of Assembly of a State. 
95 UNDP 2010: 7. 
96 Stanton 2009: 178. 
97 Stanton  2009: 179. Another example of a grant with conditions attached is the municipal infrastructure 
grant which is allocated to urban councils in South Africa. Its objective is to enable urban local authorities to 
renew their infrastructure. The grant is predetermined as it sponsors projects linked to poverty alleviation such 
as water and road infrastructure. The expending of the grant is supervised by national authorities who are tasked 
to ensure that funding is not diverted to other projects. Submission of acquittals is a prerequisite for securing 
additional funding for the next cycle of funding. Although municipal infrastructure grants provide  a financially 
important stop-gap measure for urban renewal, they weaken the fiscal resolve of  urban councils. At its worst, 
the municipal infrastructure grant relegates urban local authorities to positions of central government 
implementing agencies, contrary to the spirit of good fiscal decentralisation. 
98 Galadima 2007: 27. 
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grant, which falls between the specific-purpose and general-purpose grants shows a decline 
overtime confirming fears that the centralising tendencies of state and federal governments of 
Nigeria are on the ascend.99 Generally, the attachment of conditions to grants dispensed to 
urban councils is one of the tenets which is often regarded as being at variance with good 
intergovernmental financial transfers. Another dimension worth noting is that urban councils 
have no discretion over the commitment of the funds received from the states as grants. The 
reason for this is that the funding has conditions attached which prescribe an implementation 
role only for urban councils.100 For instance funding received for poverty alleviation 
programs cannot be spent on a project different from that agreed with the State. The lack of 
financial flexibility of urban councils is further demonstrated by the fact that they can only 
deduct administrative fees from the grants with the rest committed as dispensed by the state 
government. 
Another issue of importance to fiscal decentralisation is the amount of intergovernmental 
financial transfers to urban councils. In Nigeria, state governments are accused of retaining 
some of the allocations due to urban councils from the Federal Account.101 Although the 
rationale of the grants in India  is to reduce the horizontal fiscal imbalances102 inside the 
urban councils, this objective is not achieved as the grants fail the key test of sufficiency in 
that they are nominal in value.103  
Yet another issue is the extent to which urban councils are dependent on national or state 
governments for funding.104 In Nigeria it is said that  the extent of dependence is so bad that 
some urban councils are now largely dependent on constitutional entitlement to nationally 
raised revenue with some urban local authorities reported to be 99% dependent on the 
entitlements.105 The situation is not different in India where urban councils are 96% 
dependent on intergovernmental fiscal transfers.106 A divergence, is found in South Africa 
where urban councils are 14% dependent on national grants.107 
                                                             
99 Galadima 2009: 251. 
100 Mathew and Hooja 2009: 187. 
101 Galadima 2007: 28. 
102 Mathew and Hooja 2009: 187. 
103 Mathew and Hooja 2009: 187. 
104 Mathew and Hooja 2009: 187. 
105 Galadima 2009: 251. 
106 Mathew and Hooja 2009: 186. 
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The existence of a stable formula for calculating revenue sharing is also associated with good 
fiscal decentralization.108 This is not the case in Nigeria where the unilateral amendment of 
the revenue sharing formula by President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2003 affirmed the fact that 
federal government shapes the boundaries of the fiscal powers of the other two orders of 
government.109 President Obasanjo changed the revenue sharing formula by using an 
executive order without engaging state and local governments.110 Affirming the superiority of 
the federal government in matters of sharing of fiscal powers, President Obasanjo  used an 
executive decree to allocate 48.5%, 24% and 20% of the Federation Account to federal, state 
and local governments respectively.111  As if the tampering with the revenue sharing formula 
was not bad enough, the fiscal powers of urban councils were further reviewed by state 
governments, leaving them with watered down fiscal authority.112 Although the states in India 
have instituted a system of sharing  revenue generated by the states, the systems are not 
uniform between states.113  
A few cross cutting issues emerge from the preceding paragraphs. It was noted that 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers are considered a feature of local government policy 
financing throughout the world. In principle, there are two types of intergovernmental grants, 
which are conditional and unconditional grants. Constitutions of some countries provide for 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers while in other countries a statutory basis suffices. In yet 
other countries, the framework for intergovernmental fiscal transfers is left to political 
processes. Generally, unconditional grants are preferred by urban councils compared to 
conditional grants. The amount received in intergovernmental transfers has implications on 
the fiscal structure of an urban council. Another issue discussed is that the more an urban 
council is dependent on national or state governments for funding, the less its autonomy. Yet 
another issue discussed is the desirability of a stable formula for calculating revenue sharing.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
107 National Treasury of South Africa 2008: 8. 
108 UNDP 2010: 7. 
109 Galadima  2009: 251. 
110 Galadima  2009: 251. 
111 Galadima  2009: 251. 
112 Galadima 2007: 28. 
113 Mathew and Hooja  2009: 187. 
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3. Conclusion 
Fiscal decentralization is about the transfer of taxing and spending powers from central 
government to sub-national governments such as urban councils. Broadly speaking, there are 
four aspects that make up fiscal decentralisation. These are revenue, expenditure, borrowing 
and intergovernmental transfers. The mere provision of revenue powers in the Constitution is 
not enough. What is important is whether urban local authorities can exercise the revenue 
discretion assigned to them by the constitutional process.  Linked to this is the issue of 
whether  the sources of revenue assigned to urban councils are productive or not. Only when 
high yielding sources of revenue are availed can the issue of revenue powers make a 
difference to the revenue structure of urban councils. 
 Expenditure discretion is considered a key aspect of fiscal decentralisation. The practice is 
for central governments to restrict the expenditure discretion of urban councils. The 
restriction of urban councils takes many forms. It includes the suspension of the right of to 
expend money on certain budget lines without central government authorisation to post- 
budget control audits.  The absence of expenditure discretion presents problems in that it 
constrains the ability of urban councils to endear themselves to the service needs of urban 
communities.  
The power to borrow is an important aspect of fiscal decentralisation. A central issue in 
relation to borrowing is whether there is a legal provision empowering the state  to determine 
the outcome of the borrowing power applications of urban councils. There is also the issue of 
whether borrowing is allowed for both capital and recurrent expenditure. Another 
consideration is from which institutions borrowing is permitted.  
From the study, it also emerged that intergovernmental fiscal transfers are considered a 
feature of local government policy financing throughout the world. There are two types of 
intergovernmental grants, which are conditional and unconditional grants. Intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers can have constitutional or statutory basis. In the absence of a legal framework, 
the framework for intergovernmental fiscal transfers is left to political processes. By and 
large, unconditional grants are viewed positively compared to conditional grants. An issue of 
interest is that the  majority of urban councils are dependent on national or state governments 
for funding. Another issue of importance is the appeal of a stable formula for calculating 
revenue sharing.  
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Using the same issues identified in this chapter, the study will proceed to analyse the fiscal 
autonomy of urban councils in Zimbabwe. Before that, however, the next chapter will discuss 
the salient features of fiscal decentralisation for urban councils in Zimbabwe from a historical 
perspective. The idea is to put the current urban local government financing system in 
Zimbabwe in perspective.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
FISCAL DECENTRALISATION AND URBAN COUNCILS  
IN ZIMBABWE: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
1. Introduction 
Chapter Three discusses the salient features of fiscal decentralisation for urban councils in 
Zimbabwe from a historical perspective.  This chapter seeks to achieve this objective by 
discussing revenue, expenditure, intergovernmental fiscal transfers, and borrowing in the 
context of local government financing policy from 1890 to 1973.  It also discusses in broad 
terms the types of local governments, powers of urban councils and the sources of revenue 
provided  in the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 214, thereafter referred to as UCA) of 1973 . It 
will show that the relationship that existed between local and central government in the 
period between 1890 and 1996 can be likened to that of principal and subordinate with the 
state as the principal and urban councils as subordinate. During this period, urban local 
governments  faced a big financing challenge. At its worst, the problem was characterised by 
the existence of  a big gap between their financial resources and  expenditure needs.  
2. Fiscal decentralisation and urban councils from 1890 to 1959 
Any explanation of the type of local government system set up in the early years in 
Zimbabwe has to be informed by an understanding of the type of urban settlements that 
existed on the ground in those days. No urban local authority existed at the time of the 
formation of the first recorded urban settlement in what is now known as Harare. In the 
period between 1890 and 1923 Zimbabwe was run by a private company, the British South 
Africa Company. The Company set up the Salisbury Sanitation Board in 1892 in response to 
pressure from the residents of the emerging town who were worried about sanitary 
conditions. Arguably, the Salisbury Sanitation Board can be regarded as a single-purpose 
urban local government structure as its function was only refuse removal and management. A 
single-purpose urban council is a municipal body established and assigned one mandate of 
service provision.114 The Salisbury Sanitation Board was established by central government 
                                                             
114 Steytler 2009: 399. Examples of other single purpose urban councils are found in the United States, and to 
a lesser extent in Canada and Switzerland. In the United States, they perform important functions and provide 
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to manage environmental concerns in the urban settlement under formation.115  It was 
subordinate to central government in that Board members were appointed and reported to 
central government. The boards of management of  the single purpose local authorities116 set 
up in the fast emerging towns were made up of four elected members and three members 
nominated by the company. They were subservient to the company, had no executive powers, 
depended on the company for funding and lacked their own revenue powers. What was clear 
in 1891 was that there was reluctance on the part of central government to treat the Salisbury 
Sanitation Board as a second order of government in the making. Most notable was the delay 
in according it legal status to facilitate service provision. The delay in setting up the enabling 
legal framework is interpreted by some  as an indication that urban local government was 
grudgingly established.117 It is said that authorities were content to have a local government 
system that was subordinate to central government.  
Building on the experience of Harare, other sanitary boards were set up in 1894 in the urban 
centres of Bulawayo, Mutare and Gweru. As in the case of Harare, the company appointed 
three people to the sanitary boards. In 1897, Harare and Bulawayo became fully fledged 
urban councils, with all council members elected through the ballot system. There was no 
change in the status of urban councils up to 1923 when there was termination of the 
Company’s administration on the granting of self-government to Rhodesia.  Company rule 
ended after a majority of those voting in a referendum choice self-rule rather than being 
incorporated into the Union of South Africa. 
There appeared to be reluctance on the part of central government to link the institutional 
design for the new urban local government structure to sustainable funding models. The 
Salisbury Sanitation Board’s  scope of unfunded mandates was later  increased to include 
water supply, public lighting and native housing. The assignment of additional functions was 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
services such as portable water, wastewater treatment, transit, housing and port services. The most important of 
these are the school districts.   
 
115 The term central government is used to cover the period when Zimbabwe was run by the British South Africa 
Company. The administration of the Company was terminated in 1923 on the granting of self government to the 
country. 
116 The Boards were the equivalent of the present day urban councils. Just like the present urban councils, they 
undertook service provision work, although this was confined to sanitation issues at first.   
117 Hlatshwayo 1998: 10. 
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matched by marginal fiscal powers. The example of the Salisbury Sanitation Board in many 
ways captures the disposition of central government towards local government financing 
policy.  It was consistent with the idea that urban local authority was an inferior order of 
government.  
It was not until 1897 that the Salisbury Sanitation Board was accorded some form of funding 
mechanism through access of loans from the market. Even then, central government had to 
approve its borrowing powers.   In 1898, the Board was given authority “to  levy an annual 
rate of ten shillings on the owners of every plot in the township.”118 A year later the sanitation 
boards of Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare and Gweru (also referred to as town councils) raised 
fees in exchange for providing services such as water, electricity, sanitary services and 
housing.119  
The prospects for a better framework for financing urban councils arose in 1901 when central 
government agreed to give land rights to urban councils which had attained municipal 
status.120 The possession of land rights enabled urban local authorities to raise revenue 
through land sales to private individuals and those who bought the land for purposes of  
constructing business premises. Once the business operations were up and running, they 
contributed to the revenue coffers of urban local governments under whose jurisdictions they 
operated. 
In 1910, central government injected funding into urban councils to assist with the effort of 
setting up infrastructure for the urban areas under formation.  With the growth of urban 
settlements,  municipal trunk infrastructure programs such as water and sewerage works 
                                                             
118 Nhemachena and Matongo  2000: 3. 
119 Nhemachena and Matongo  2000: 4. 
120 Chakaipa 2010: 36. There is a hierarchy of urban councils in Zimbabwe. The lowest level of urban councils 
consists of local boards, followed by town councils, then municipalities and lastly we have cities. Local boards 
and town councils have limited land rights compared to municipal councils and cities. The land rights of urban 
councils below municipal councils was and continues to be subject to central government control with serious 
implications for their financial liquidity. The elevation and graduation of urban councils is a feature associated 
with Zimbabwe urban councils since the early days when the country was under company rule. Section 4 (1) of 
the UCA and section 4 (1) of the 1996 Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15)  provides  for the establishment of 
different levels of urban councils. It can be argued, that the Salisbury Sanitary Board, was the equivalent of the 
present day local board. It was the lowest order in the hierarchy of urban councils.   
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benefited from  intergovernmental fiscal transfers.121 These were mainly high impact service 
programs whose establishment was beyond the financial means of individual urban local 
governments. The scope of central government financial support was  widened the same year 
(1910) to cater for the provision of urban networks that would link towns to the hinterlands.  
In 1958 a select committee of parliament was appointed to consider financing arrangements 
for all urban local governments. The Committee noted in its findings that urban councils with 
small revenue bases were struggling compared to those with varied revenue bases. It was 
affirmed that bigger urban local governments used their varied revenue bases to cushion 
themselves against a lack of readily available revenue raising powers.122 Their finances were 
buoyed by revenue coming from rental fees, license fees, supplementary charges, revenue 
generating projects, interest on investments, revenue from service delivery and rates on 
property and land.123  
3. Fiscal decentralisation and urban councils from 1960-1972 
As it was the case during the period between 1890 to 1960, an appreciation of the type of 
local government established from 1960 to 1972 should be informed by an understanding of 
the historical imperatives in place during the period under review. The Second World War 
resulted in a period of industrial growth in the urban areas of Zimbabwe.124 This led to the 
phenomenal growth of towns, necessitating the need for an increase in the number of urban 
councils. In response to the new imperatives, seven urban councils including Harare and 
Bulawayo were conferred city council status by private Acts of parliament in 1967.125 The 
city councils were subservient to central government. Their revenue and expenditure powers 
were subject to regulation by central government. In many ways they were creatures of 
statute which existed at the whims and discretion of central government. During that period, 
26 town management boards and 3 local committees were established to provide services in 
the smaller towns. The boards and committees relied on central government for funding and 
were very much subject to centralising tendencies.   
                                                             
121 Nhemachena and Matongo  2000: 4. 
122 New revenue raising powers needed central government approval before execution. This legal requirement is 
the subject of condemnation by urban local authorities who would like to see central government confine its 
mandate to the environmental management of local government sector. 
123 Nhemachena and Matongo  2000: 8. 
124 Marsh, Roper and Kotze 1974: 188. 
125Marsh, Roper and Kotze 1974: 188.  
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The exclusion of smaller urban councils in 1961from administering land rights adversely 
affected their balance sheets. An opportunity was missed to settle the question of local 
government financing when the Judges Commission was tasked to study modalities for 
optimally providing education in 1962 but failed to address the funding modalities for local 
government. It was largely in keeping with the findings of the Judges Commission that a 
decision was taken in principle in 1963, that future responsibility for the provision of primary 
education should “fall mainly upon local government and its constituent communities”.126 
Another opportunity to substantively address the question of funding modalities for local 
government was missed when the Prime Minister’s Policy Directive on Local Government 
was issued in July 1965. Sir Edgar Whitehead, the then Prime Minister, said that government 
would be decentralising some of its functions in line with the principle of subsidiarity.127 
Although central government adopted a broad plan for the implementation of local 
government as national policy in Zimbabwe in 1965, the landscape of urban local 
government financing continued to be characterised by intergovernmental financial 
transfers.128  
A pattern of central government domination of urban local government fiscal powers emerges 
again in 1966 from an analysis of the centre-local relationship. Local government was  
subordinate to central government in that its revenue powers were validated by the centre.129 
The centre increased the subordination by entrenching its use of intergovernmental transfers 
as a tool to control urban councils. Thus, roughly fifty percent of the revenue of urban 
councils, about $4 million, was derived from government subsidies.130 The subsidies included 
initial grants given to urban councils in the first year to help establish themselves. In 1967, 
urban councils also received block grants on a formula basis varying with the amounts of 
rates collected. This formula decreased after a figure of Z$10 000131 had been raised in rates. 
The increased reliance on transfers adversely impacted the local autonomy of the urban 
councils.    
 
                                                             
126 Ministerial Statement on African Education and Community Development 1963: 4. 
127 Nhemachena and Matongo  2000: 5. 
128 Passmore   1980: 92. 
129 Passmore   1980: 93. 
130 Passmore   1980: 93. 
131 Passmore   1980: 93. 
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4. Fiscal decentralisation and the Urban Councils Act of 1973 
As the foregoing discussion suggested, centralisation tendencies characterised the history of 
local government between 1890 to 1973. The enactment of the UCA did not improve the 
status of urban councils since they remained subservient to central government. The 
legislation came at a time when it was becoming increasingly evident that structural and 
institutional changes needed to be carried out to strengthen the institution of  urban councils. 
It had become apparent that financing models for local government needed to adapt to the 
challenges posed by the phenomenon of urbanisation.132  
In total, the UCA is organised into 271 sections and four schedules. The UCA provides for 
other issues pertinent to urban councils besides financing arrangements which are covered 
mainly from sections 178 to section 254. In broad terms, the UCA provides for the 
establishment of municipalities, towns, the administration of municipalities, the conferring of 
city status on urban councils, the powers and functions of urban councils. The Act reserves 
power to the President to dispense with or modify any provisions in the Act once the 
President is satisfied that such action will not prejudice anyone. The Act assigns the Minister 
of Local Government authority to administer the UCA. Of particular interest to this research 
paper are the wide powers assigned to the Minister as these have grim implications for the 
fiscal autonomy of urban councils.133 On the next pages, this chapter, using the essential 
features of fiscal decentralisation developed in the previous chapter, will analyse the UCA 
with the view to assess the extent to which it provides for fiscal allocation.  
4.1 Revenue 
The sources of revenue provided for in the UCA included rates on land and property134, 
service charges, fees charged, penalties and fines.135 Other sources were license fees, 
supplementary charges, plan approval and development fees, profit from revenue generating 
enterprises, lease fees, proceeds from land sale, rental fees and interest on investment.136  
                                                             
132 Nhemachena and Matongo  2000: 5. 
133 An example of such intrusive powers is S 184 (1) (a) of the UCA which  gives a blank cheque to the Minister 
of Local Government to regulate the financial processes of urban councils. 
134 S 217 of UCA. 
135 S 178 (1) of UCA. 
136 Coutinho  2010: 71-86. 
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Property rates were a viable source of revenue raised on all non-residential properties. High 
density suburb137 properties were charged supplementary charges which was the equivalent 
of property rates. The growth of non-residential property pushed property and land rates to 
the frontline of local government financing policy. As a result, rates for non-residential 
property and land constituted between 20 to 30 percent of council revenue.138 However, state 
land and properties were exempt from property rates.  
Service charges were paid by urban residents in exchange for council services they consumed 
such as refuse collection, sewer and effluent removal, health care and water consumption.139 
Fees were levied for use of council amenities such as schools, bus termini, caravan parks, bus 
entry fees, street parking, cemeteries and crematoria. Penalties and fines were also raised 
from those caught violating council by-laws.140 Examples of violations included constructing 
unapproved buildings, illegal parking and environmental pollution. License fees were paid in 
exchange for permission for activities incidental to owning a dog, bicycle, motor vehicle and 
trading shop within the jurisdiction of an urban council.141 In order to demonstrate general 
trends in the contributions of the sources of revenue, the example of the budget of the 
Municipality of Chinhoyi142 in 1978 is used. The urban council’s budget of $3 million was 
financed as follows: refuse collection fees (9%), sewer and effluent removal (5%), health care 
(1.3%), water fees (15%), school fees (0.97%), bus termini fees (0.3%), cemeteries and 
crematoria (0.50%), fines (2%), supplementary charges (10%), property taxes (20.93%) and 
other sources of revenue (9.00%).143   
                                                             
137 The term high density suburbs is used in Zimbabwe to refer to low income suburbs. These are suburbs where 
the poor live. Examples of such suburbs in the City of Harare are Mbare, Highfield, Glen Norah and Glen View. 
City of Harare tariffs for these areas are regulated by the Minister of Local Government. High density suburbs 
are also known as local government areas. 
138 Nhemachena and Matongo  2000: 6. 
139 S 178 (1) of UCA. 
140 S 178 (1) of UCA. 
141 S 178 (1) of UCA. 
142 The Municipality of Chinhoyi runs the town of Chinhoyi which is situated 100 kilometres to the west of the 
City of Harare. It is an agricultural and mining town in the Mashonaland West Province. The advent of the land 
reform program and the closure of major mining operations around the town has affected the revenue of the 
municipality. Similarly, the industrial sector is in slow growth mode, thus affecting the regeneration of the town.  
143 Ministry of Local Government 1979: 7. 
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A few issues emerge from the previous paragraphs on revenue. The sources of revenue 
assigned to urban councils under the UCA were insufficient. In relation to revenue, another 
issue relates to the inadequate revenue powers for urban councils under UCA. Related to this 
is central government domination of revenue powers of urban councils. This is reflected in 
the assignment of inelastic and low yielding sources of revenue. The lucrative sources of 
revenue were kept for central government. The low yielding sources of revenue did not 
positively impact the revenue structures of urban councils. Yet another phenomenon noticed 
is that the reliance by urban councils on property tax and service fees did not elevate their 
revenue status.  
4.2 Expenditure 
The urban councils were subject to financial control for the funding which they received from 
central government. In this regard, they had to account for the way they had used the money. 
Any future disbursement of intergovernmental transfers was predicated on a report 
confirming that the guidelines and conditionalities imposed on the funds that were transferred 
to urban local authorities were fully complied with. The Minister of Local Government was 
empowered under section 251 (4) of the UCA to deploy auditors to go and inspect the books 
of accounts of urban councils without the consent of the urban local authority concerned. The 
Minister had legal authority to review the audits done by council auditors.144 In order to 
intensify intrusive control, the Minister of Local Government established a parastatal called 
the Urban Development Corporation145 to undertake the audit of books of accounts of urban 
councils. The parastatal takes order from central government.  
Similarly, section 245 (3)146 of the UCA gives authority to the Minister as the only one who 
could vary expenditures related to the consolidated loans fund although the funds are already 
                                                             
144 Wekwete  1992: 4. 
145 Wekwete  1992: 4.-Central government tried to justify the establishment of the parastatal by claiming that it 
would assist urban councils in securing their financial control and that it would offer cheaper audit fees 
compared with auditors from the private sector. 
146 S 245 (1) provided as follows: 
                                  “ where the income accruing to a municipal council in the form of rates levied 
                                   in terms of section two hundred and twenty exceeds five thousand dollars 
                                     annually, the municipal council may, in accordance with a scheme prepared 
                                    by it and approved by the Minister, establish and operate a consolidated loans 
                                    fund which shall be used to account for all moneys borrowed, the redemption 
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resident with urban councils. A consolidated loans fund is a fund used to account for all 
moneys borrowed, the redemption or interest thereof and the payment of interest thereon.147 
This fund may only be established once an urban council has accrued income in the form of 
rates in excess of $500 000.148 Urban councils need the approval of the Minister of Local 
Government to establish a consolidated loans fund. Once established, its use is regulated by 
the said Minister.149  
Section 240 of the UCA forbids urban councils to meet their salary obligations from the 
capital development fund without authorisation from the Minister. A capital development 
fund is a fund used to procure equipment for service provision such as road construction 
equipment, service vehicles, equipment for water provision and sewer works. The foregoing 
paragraph has shown how urban councils are constrained in exercising expenditure 
discretion, making them a subordinate order of government.  
The restriction of expenditure discretion does not bode well for urban councils in a country 
claiming to be implementing elements of fiscal decentralisation.  The lack of expenditure 
discretion robbed urban local authorities the opportunity to build capacity to enable them to 
be effective as a local order of government. Most importantly, it pronounced the vertical 
imbalance in the distribution of power, with central government carrying more political clout.  
4.3 Borrowing 
Borrowing by urban councils for purposes of financing recurrent expenditure was not 
provided for in the UCA. Instead, borrowing powers were authorised for the following  long 
term capital development projects: 
 the acquisition and construction of permanent works or undertakings;150 
 the acquisition of immovable property or any interest therein;151 
 the making of advances authorised by this or any other Act;152 
 the payment of compensation;153 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
                                    or repayment thereof and the payment of interest thereon.” 
147 S 245 (1) of the UCA. 
148 S 245 (1) of the UCA. 
149 S 245 (1) of the UCA. 
150 S 238 (1) (a) of the UCA. 
151 S 238 (1) (b) of the UCA. 
152 S 238 (1) (c) of the UCA. 
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 the liquidation of the principal monies owing on account of any previous 
borrowings;154 
 the relief of general distress occasioned by some calamity in the council area;155 
 the acquisition of plant, equipment, vehicles and the like.156 
Local government financing arrangements could also be entered into with the state, the Local 
Authorities Pension Fund, a municipal medical aid society, medical aid fund or another local 
authority.157 Additionally, funding, with the consent of the Minister of Finance, could also be 
raised from issue stock, bonds, debentures or bills.158 In all these instances, urban councils 
were expected to secure the approval of the Minister of Local Government.                                                                                                                               
The borrowing power application needed to be presented to the Minister of Local 
Government for his approval.159 Although the UCA provided for the sourcing of funding 
from third parties, the Minister of Local Government could refuse to approve the borrowing 
power application unless certain conditions prescribed in the enabling Act were met.160 The 
thinking was that, unless local borrowing was regulated, urban local government could end 
up overextending itself financially. There was also fear of the ramifications associated with 
unregulated local government borrowing driving up the interest rates.161 Worse still was the 
contention that excessive local government borrowing affects the ability of central 
government to use fiscal policy to manage macro-economic conditions. The concern arose 
because central government was expected to assume responsibility in the event that an urban 
council failed to return the money borrowed from financial institutions.162 The other reason 
was that since urban local authorities were part of the public sector, it was often assumed that 
central government would fund local deficits or guarantee local government arrears.163 In 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
153 S 238 (1) (d) of the UCA. 
154 S 238 (1) (e) of the UCA. 
155 S 238 (1) (f) of the UCA. 
156 S 238 (1) (g) of the UCA. 
157 S 238 (5) (a) of the UCA. 
158 S 238 (5) (b) of the UCA. 
159 S 238 (2) (c) of the UCA.  
160 S 238 (3) of the UCA. 
161 Nyoni and Dingani  2000: 10. They said  that significant indicators to note were  the doubling of interest    
payments from 22% in 1998 to 48% in 2001.   
162 S 238 (4) of the UCA.  
163 UNDP  2010: 6. 
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practice, the Ministers of Local Government and Finance jointly put their signatures to each 
borrowing power certificate, in the process committing central government in the event that 
an urban council defaulted on its payment.164  
The approval of borrowing powers, provided for in the UCA, was a feature consistent with  
principal-subordinate relationship that characterised the relationship between central and 
urban local governments. The procedure of accessing borrowing powers was bureaucratic. 
For instance, it was said that it took as long as six months before central government satisfied 
itself that a council met the conditions for borrowing powers.165 Stringent regulation was 
often cited as the reason urban councils failed to access private funding for the renewal of 
urban infrastructure.166 At times, financiers called off funding because the process of securing 
borrowing powers was too cumbersome. Only two urban councils, the city of Harare (capital 
city) and city of Bulawayo (second biggest city) had been given authority to borrow from the 
private sector by 1992, signifying excessive control by central government on borrowing as a 
source of funding for urban councils.167 
4.4 Intergovernmental financial transfers 
The UCA did not provide for intergovernmental fiscal transfers leaving settlement of the 
issue to the judgment of central government.168 In other words, central government exercised 
unfettered discretion choosing at will the urban councils who benefitted. The lack of 
constitutional instruction to guide the dispensing of financial transfers also meant that the 
amount of transfers simply depended on the wishes of central government. 
In 1993, the government used to transfer funds to urban councils providing health care in the 
form of reimbursements for expenditure on capital development. But the reduction in central 
government grants was most noticeable in 1994.169 The government ended up providing 
grants which were on average 3% of health expenditures.170 This left councils to fund the 
balance from very expensive overdrafts or unsustainable increases in rates and other 
                                                             
164 Ministry of Local Government  2010: 10. 
165 Nhemachena and Matongo  2000: 9. 
166 Wekwete  1992: 5. 
167 Wekewte  1992: 4. 
168 Nhemachena and Matongo 2000: 9. 
169 Matongo and Nhemachena 2000: 8. 
170 Matongo and Nhemachena 2000: 8. 
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charges.171 The health deficits translated into huge cash flow problems for councils in that 
councils had to finance health expenditures through very expensive overdrafts.172 Health 
grants were reduced by more than 100% from  13% of the budget in 1995 to 5% in the 2001 
budget.173 Although urban councils received budgetary support, the non existence of an 
institutional basis for the financial transfers entrenched dependence and promoted 
asymmetries. Budgetary support went towards projects decided on by central government.  
A dimension that emerged in 1995 was the use of conditional funding as a tool to regulate 
urban councils by prescribing the parameters under which the funding was used.174 There was 
little central government commitment towards urban renewal demonstrated through an 
increase in allocations for unconditional funding. Centralising tendencies were entrenched in 
that what constituted an approved expenditure was determined by the centre. In addition, in 
order to entrench its oversight role, the centre, in late 1996, began to develop regulations and 
circulars informing the usage of the grants.175 The grant system worked with advances and 
reimbursements based upon approvals. These were based on central calculations of local 
requirements.176  Even then, central government was not under any constitutional imperatives 
to justify the allocation of the transfers.  In the absence of a constitutionalised or other agreed 
upon formula prescribed for calculating the transfers, urban councils could not challenge the 
allocations.  
The argument for entitlement to nationally raised revenue began to manifest in 1995 as it 
became clear that government grants were declining in real terms. It was said that the 
equitable share would compensate for the loss of revenue suffered by urban councils given 
the regulation of their fiscal powers.177  There was a concern that the grants depended on the 
discretion of the intermediary ministries. They were viewed by urban local governments 
                                                             
171 Matongo and Nhemachena 2000: 8. 
172 Matongo and Nhemachena 2000: 8. 
173 Government Budget Expenditures and Estimates for 2001. 
174 Ministry of Local Government 1999: 4. 
175 Ministry of Local Government 1999: 4. 
176 Ministry of Local Government 1999: 4. 
177 Nyoni and Dingani  2000: 21. Arguments for equitable share of nationally generated revenue are influenced 
by the local government policy financing model in neighbouring South Africa. S 227 (1) (a) of the Constitution 
of South Africa provides that local government (and each province) “is entitled to an equitable share of revenue 
raised nationally to enable it to provide basic services and perform the functions allocated to it.”  
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more as a “favour” than an obligation.178 The transfers were detested as they were tied to 
particular central government policy outcomes and promoted financial dependence and policy 
subservience. 
4.5 Analysing the Urban Councils Act of 1973 
Although the UCA rationalised the revenue raising powers of urban local government, it did 
not facilitate the assignment of full fiscal powers. The centre assigned revenue powers to 
urban local governments at its discretion in keeping with the design of the UCA. It could 
withdraw the assigned powers as it wished. Beyond the provisions in the UCA, the centre 
confirmed its superiority by ensuring that urban councils would open negotiations with it 
each time they wished to develop new streams of revenue. On the other hand, expenditure on 
some budget lines was executed at the will of the Minister of Local Government. Similarly, it 
can be argued that the urban councils lacked expenditure powers, as these were either 
restricted by the UCA or were overridden by central government. The division of expenditure 
powers was skewed in favour of the centre. Equally, the fiscal powers of urban council in 
relation to borrowing were under siege from the said Minister. Although not provided in the 
UCA, centralising influences dominated the dynamics of intergovernmental financial 
transfers. Most importantly, urban councils could not appeal against unfair treatment in their 
quest for additional fiscal powers as the Minister of Local Government had final authority 
over the administration of the Act. Generally, the centre continued to dominate the dynamics 
of local fiscal powers under the UCA. 
5. Conclusion 
Broadly speaking, urban councils lacked fiscal autonomy during the period between 1890 and 
1996. The lack of fiscal authority can be traced from the early days when the first structure 
resembling an urban council, the Salisbury Sanitation Board, was conceived in 1891. The 
insincerity of central government to address the issue of the fiscal autonomy of urban 
councils is discernible as one analyses the status, profile and development of urban local 
authorities between 1901 and 1965. Centralising tendencies ran supreme and so did the 
determination of central government to tilt the balance of power in its favour. The picture that 
emerges during that period is of a central government that is obsessed with its big brother 
                                                             
178 Nyoni and Dingani  2000: 21. 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
position by denying urban councils constitutional recognition and subsequent fiscal authority 
that comes with an elevated position.  
The story did not change with the enactment of the UCA of 1973. The position of urban 
councils as subordinate creatures in the configuration of status and fiscal power is sustained.  
There was no interest in providing for legal measures that would narrow the gap between 
responsibility and expenditure. The expenditure discretion of urban local authorities was 
tightened.  The statutory provisions on the approval of borrowing power applications 
strengthened the ability of the centre to shape the local mandate of urban councils. The 
absence of a statutory provision for a claim by urban councils to intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers further weakened urban councils. 
 Fiscal autonomy was important in as far as it ensured that urban councils fulfilled their 
mandates to the full.  The importance was underscored by the fact that service delivery 
suffered because sustainable local government financing policy mechanisms were not in 
place. But law reform over the years failed to settle concerns around the fiscal autonomy of 
urban councils. Central government seemed happy with the status quo for as long as 
institutional design accorded it unfettered power to determine financing models for urban 
councils. As urban local government became sure footed, some argued that central 
government should have reduced its siege on the fiscal powers of urban councils.179 Others 
suggested that central government needed to focus its expenditure programs on activities that 
involved externalities between urban jurisdictions.180 The justification was that urban local 
governments by their very nature do not have the capacity to address income differentials 
between regions which are often substantial.181  The most important development regarding 
urban councils came with the enactment of the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15) of 1996. 
The question that now begs an answer is whether the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15) of 
1996 endows urban local authorities with the fiscal authority to translate expenditure into 
concrete policy outcomes. The next chapter will endeavour to address that question in 
earnest.  
 
                                                             
179 Nhemachena and Matongo  2000: 5. 
180 Nhemachena and Matongo  2000: 5. 
181 Nhemachena and Matongo  2000: 5. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FISCAL DECENTRALISATION: ANALYSING  
THE URBAN COUNCILS ACT OF 1996 
1. Introduction 
The chapter seeks to evaluate the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by urban councils in Zimbabwe 
within the framework of the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15, thereafter referred to as the 
1996 Act) of 1996. It tries to achieve this by analysing the legal framework for fiscal 
decentralisation for urban councils in Zimbabwe. The chapter commences the discussion by 
explaining the constitutional framework for urban councils. Following this, it discusses the 
fiscal powers of urban local authorities. It then discusses the legal framework for revenue. 
The discussion then shifts to the legal framework for expenditure. This is followed by an 
examination of the enabling framework for borrowing by urban local authorities. The inter-
governmental financial transfers will be discussed in light of the current practice since the 
Act does not provide for it.  
2. The Constitutional framework 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe as amended in 1995 does not affirm funding arrangements for 
urban councils. In fact, the Constitution is quiet on the establishment of local government, 
preferring instead to recognise the existence of Provincial Governors and Chiefs as sub-
national levels of government. In fact, urban local governments are seen as mere creatures of 
central government existing at its discretion.  A notable feature of urban local authorities in 
Zimbabwe is their lack of independent autonomous status. The Constitution of Zimbabwe is 
not explicit on local government policy financing arrangements. 
The only attempt at entrenching the fiscal integrity of urban local governments presented 
itself in a draft Constitution which was rejected in a referendum in 1999.182  The draft 
Constitution of 1999 provided for central government funding of urban local authorities to 
                                                             
182  Chidyausiku draft constitution of 1999. The draft constitution was rejected by Zimbabweans in a referendum 
held in 1999. The failed constitutional process was led  by the current Chief Justice, Godfrey Chidyausiku. The 
draft constitution of 1999 is refered to as the Chidyausiku draft constitution, after the current Chief Justice of 
Zimbabwe who was appointed by central government to head the search for a new constitutional order. 
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enable them to carry out  functions assigned by law. In the absence of a constitutional status, 
the institutions of urban councils are perceived as extensions of central government with no 
capacity to make autonomous decisions on financing issues. The lack of constitutional 
recognition of urban local government as an order in its own right is often cited as the main 
cause of fragile urban local authority financing policy in Zimbabwe.  
3. The Urban Councils Act of 1996 
The major legislation regarding fiscal decentralisation for urban councils is the 1996 Act. 
Like its predecessor, the 1996 Act is a regulatory framework for urban councils in Zimbabwe. 
Although in many ways similar to its predecessor, the Act exhibits some features that are 
unique to itself. First, its enactment is historic, coming as it does after the attainment of 
majority independence in 1980.183 Second, it demonstrates efforts by the administration in 
power to rid the urban councils sector of varying thrusts, in keeping with efforts to dismantle 
the provision of services in urban areas along racial lines.184 Third, it attempts to rationalise 
procedures for all urban councils. Most important for this research paper, it provides for 
funding models.185 The 1996 Act is divided into 321 sections. As its predecessor, it assigns 
powers of its administration to the Minister of Local Government. The powers to create and 
abolish an urban council are reserved for the President.  
There are 31 urban councils serving urban communities in Zimbabwe. In ascending order, 
there are local boards, town councils, municipal councils and city councils. Various issues are 
taken on board when considering the elevation of urban councils to the various strata, 
including, the size and density of population, the extent to which the local authority provides 
employment opportunities within the city and the environs, the total valuation of properties 
therein classified into commercial, retail, industrial and administrative profiles, the provision 
of social amenities, historical realities and political considerations.186   
                                                             
183 Matumbike  2009: 9. 
184 Matumbike  2009: 9. 
185 Matumbike  2009 :9. 
186 First schedule (S 14) of the 1996 Act. On the other hand there are 60 rural district councils which carry out 
similar functions as urban councils but their area of focus is the rural areas. The Rural District Councils Act 
(Chapter 29:13) of 1996 establishes rural district councils. The Minister of Local Government administers both 
the 1996 Act and the Rural District Councils Act (Chapter 29:13). Both the urban councils and rural district 
councils are creatures of the statutes and therefore enjoy delegated powers.  
 
 
 
 
38 
 
The Act sets a framework for the operation of urban councils, including matters such as the 
service provision mandate of urban local authorities.187  Currently, fifty four functional areas 
are mentioned in Second Schedule188 as comprising the operational scope of urban councils 
in Zimbabwe. The functional areas are executed in terms of the enabling legislation but in 
practice depend on the financial capacity of urban councils. The functions assigned to urban 
councils can be divided into mandatory and permissive functions with the mandatory 
functions being those services considered a must for any urban local authority. Examples of 
mandatory functions include road construction and maintenance, water reticulation, 
environmental management, primary health care, building regulation and enforcement of the 
protection of the land-use.189  Permissive functions are those services over which they have 
discretion in providing. Examples of permissive functions include fire protection, parks, 
recreation, cultural facilities, libraries and provision of cemeteries irrespective of size, 
geographical location or capacity. They also complement central government in the delivery 
of essential services such as road construction and primary health care.190  Mushamba191 lists 
the categories of the main functions of urban local authorities as:  
 development functions; 
 forward planning functions; 
 financial functions; 
 governance functions; and 
 regulatory functions 
Content is given to the fifty-four functional areas of urban local authorities by policy 
statements, statutory law and infrequently court judgements.192  
4. Fiscal powers of urban local governments 
Zimbabwe is a unitary state with the most lucrative fiscal sources of revenue assigned to 
central government. Examples of lucrative taxes accorded to national government include 
                                                             
187 S 198 (1) of the 1996 Act. 
188 Second Schedule to the 1996 Act. 
189 S198 as read with Second Schedule to the 1996 Act. 
190 S 198 as read with Second Schedule to the 1996 Act. 
191 Mushamba  2009: 105. 
192 S 198 as read with Second Schedule to the 1996 Act. 
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customs duty, excise duty, sales tax, company tax and income tax.193  Many reasons are given 
for the dominance of central government in the fiscal powers of urban councils. Some of the 
reasons relate to the need for national unity, stability and equitable development. There is 
also concern that urban local governments could make regional disparities wider than they 
already are if they are provided with unfettered access to additional sources of revenue.194 
Furthermore, it is argued that placing taxes such as customs duty and excise duty in the hands 
of urban councils could create distortions in the economy.195 Finally, revenue sources that are 
assigned to urban councils are being said to be acceptable politically as they relate to service 
consumption by the taxpayers.196  The distrust in the ability of urban councils to administer 
devolved fiscal powers is evident from the fact that the power of the Minister of Local 
Government to regulate local government financing is entrenched in the 1996 Act.197  
As indicated earlier, the urban local governments in Zimbabwe derive their fiscal powers 
largely from the Act which is administered by the Minister of Local Government. Other fiscal 
powers of urban local governments are found in other Acts which are not administered by the 
Minister of Local Government.  Examples of such Acts include the Water Act (Chapter 
20:22), the Education Act (Chapter 20:04), the Land Survey Act (Chapter 20:12), the 
Electricity Act (Chapter 13: 05), the Liquor Licensing Act and the Roads Traffic Act 
(Chapter 13:11). The discussion in this chapter will be confined to the 1996 Act since it is the 
only Act from which the fiscal decentralisation for urban councils in Zimbabwe can be 
assessed meaningfully. 
4.1 Revenue 
Section 269 (1) of the 1996 Act provides for property taxes as a source of revenue for urban 
local authorities. Property taxes are easier to administer at the local level as properties are 
visible, fixed and a clear indicator of one form of wealth. A major area of concern has been 
the inability of many urban councils to collect property rates.198 Inadequate data capture has 
                                                             
193 S 101 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe of 1995. 
194 Ministry of Local Government  2009: 9. 
195 This is the response of the ruling party (ZANU PF)  to suggestions from (ZAPU) a regional opposition party  
that the current constitution making process result in the devolution of fiscal powers to provinces and local 
governments.  
196 Ministry of Local Government 2009: 10. 
197 Mushamba  2010: 114. 
198 Coutinho  2010: 73. 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
meant that many urban councils are losing revenue. In addition, the exemption of state land 
and government buildings from the payment of property rates diminishes further the revenue 
that accrues to the financial coffers of urban councils.199 Yet another constraint in the 
collection of property rates is the failure by urban local governments to set up rating zones 
and rating units to be assigned to residential properties for rating purposes.200 
Fees are the other major source of revenue for urban councils. For example, section 219 (1) 
(a) (1) of the 1996 Act provides for the collection of fees in exchange for removal of refuse 
from properties of ratepayers.201 Water fees as a source of revenue for urban councils are 
provided for in the Act.202 In addition, section 96 (3) of the 1996 Act authorises urban 
councils to run health care facilities. 203 Section 219 (1) (a) (111) of the 1996 Act, on the 
other hand, forms the basis for cemetery fees204 and primary school fees205 as sources of 
revenue for urban local authorities. Generally speaking, the fees do not generate adequate 
                                                             
199 Coutinho  2010: 73. 
200 Coutinho  2010: 73. 
201 S 229 (2) of the 1996 Act. Although refuse collection fees are a viable source of revenue for urban local 
authorities, residents do not always settle their accounts on time in protest against erratic service. The Minister 
of Local Government has authority under the 1996 Act to reduce the tariff for refuse collection. Residents and 
ratepayers associations make the situation worse by calling on their membership to boycott payments until 
service delivery improves. 
202 S 219 (1) (a) (1) of the 1996 Act. 
203 Coutinho 2009: 74. Note that urban local governments are constrained as their health fees are subject to 
regulation by central government. The thinking of central government in prescribing health fees seems to be that 
allowing urban councils to effect full cost recovery on primary health care disadvantages poor members who 
may be pushed out of the health care system and yet the right to life is not negotiable. 
204 There are problems associated with cemetery fees as a source of revenue for urban local authorities. It is said 
that urban councils do not realise much revenue from selling burial space because of the social nature of 
cemetery fees. The cemetery fees they collect for providing burial space do not come close to covering the 
administration costs which they incur. Often there are complaints that cemetery fees are so low that they do not 
cover the costs of running and maintaining the cemetery. As is the case with primary health care, other cost 
centres are responsible for sustaining cemeteries owned and run by urban councils. 
205 Although provision of primary education is a local government function, it is said that not much revenue is 
realised from school fees. In conformity with central government policy, urban local governments are not 
allowed free rein in determining levels of school fees in the schools that they run. Council schools in urban areas 
have to be sustained by other income generating accounts as is the case with primary health care and cemeteries. 
In the past, this mandate used to benefit from beer profits but contrary to expectation central government chose 
to reduce this source of revenue by collecting excise duties on the beer produced205. This effectively shifted the 
burden of financing the service onto other urban council general taxes such as rates and supplementary charges. 
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revenue for most urban local authorities. This is attributable to a number of problems 
associated with the general administration of the fees. For example, water user fees are 
normally set at sub-economic levels as urban local authorities attempt to subdue consumer 
backlash. As a result, the majority of urban local governments in Zimbabwe do not use the 
cost recovery charging systems which tie the amount of money paid directly to the water 
consumed.206  Added to this is the scenario presented by different political groups grappling 
for power taking over ratepayers concerns about high water fees for political gains. It is said 
that there is often political pressure on the local tax administration to relax user fees and 
revenue collection in the period leading to crucial elections.207 There are also other problems 
associated with charging fees. For instance, payment of refuse fees is erratic as residents 
protest the failure of urban councils to offer a sustainable service.208 The clinic fees are not 
determined on the basis of full cost recovery. It is said that the clinic fees do not even come 
close to recovering a quarter of the cost of health drugs in stock.209 This leads to a situation 
where primary health care is subsidised by other cost centres within urban local 
governments.210   
It is pertinent to note that urban councils’ capacity to raise revenue from fees is further 
limited by the fact that they have to seek the Minister of Local Government’s approval of any 
tariff for suburbs where poor people live.211 Section 219 of the 1996 Act affords urban 
councils some measure of discretion over sources of revenue by stipulating that a full council 
resolution is the basis for setting charges. However, the Act compels an urban local authority 
to seek the Minister’s approval before executing a tariff in a poor suburb where the majority 
of ratepayers are located. The objective of the policy is to ensure that the poor are not 
excluded from municipal services by their lack of ability to afford municipal charges for 
services. Only when objections to the tariff have been resolved and the tariff has been 
gazetted by the Minister of Local Government does the tariff come into operation in the poor 
suburbs.212 This limits the revenue which urban local authorities can raise. 
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207 Chirisa and Jonga  2010: 8. 
208 Coutinho  2010: 74. 
209 Nhemachena and Matongo  2000:  17. 
210 Nhemachena and Matongo  2000: 18. 
211 S 219 (1) (c) proviso (a) of the 1996 Act. 
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Section 228 (2) of the 1996 Act authorises urban local authorities to come up with by-laws 
with revenue implications.  Examples of by-laws with revenue implications include dog and 
hawker’s licenses.213 The powers of urban councils to come up with by-laws with revenue 
implications are subject to the approval of the Minister of Local Government. The Minister of 
Local Government has authority to approve or disapprove any by-laws.  
The inadequacy of revenue is evident in many ways. An analysis of the performance of a 
budget of an urban local authority can reveal misalignment between revenue and expenditure. 
In this regard, the existence of a budget deficit is compelling evidence of inadequate revenue. 
For example the City of Harare budgeted to collect revenue amounting to US$230.09 million 
in 2010 against expenditure target of US$275.63million, resulting in a budget deficit of 
US$45.54 million.214 Similarly, an analysis of the water account of the City of Harare for the 
2010 financial year shows that the City is set to collect a mere US$77.33 million or 
(33.6%)215 of total revenue of US$230.09 million. This is a drop in the ocean compared to the 
same period in 2001 when the contribution of the water account was steady at around 45%216 
of council total revenue. The property rates which were previously considered the cash cow 
of the City of Harare are showing poor performance at US$47.96 million or (20.8%)217 
contribution in the 2010 budget against performances averaging 30%218 of the total budget in 
the early 2000s.  Inadequate revenue results in poor service provision, which is notable 
through poor water supply, refuse removal and sewer system.219 Besides reducing the fiscal 
autonomy of urban councils, inadequate funding makes urban local authorities subservient to 
central government in many ways. It increases the commitment of urban councils to central 
government and exposes them to centralising tendencies which scuttle efforts to link 
communities’ expenditures to own revenues. It creates a situation in which urban councils 
increasingly look to central government to bail them out financially, strengthening the 
perception that central government is a superior order of government.220   
                                                             
213 Coutinho  2010: 75. 
214 Coutinho  2010: 78. 
215 Coutinho  2010:78. 
216 Ministry of Local Government  2004: 2. 
217 Coutinho  2010: 78. 
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4.2 Expenditure 
As indicated in chapter two, the role of urban councils in developing and executing their 
expenditure programs with minimal central government oversight is considered a key aspect 
of good fiscal decentralisation.221 This is not the case with urban local authorities in 
Zimbabwe where the intrusive nature of the Ministry of Local Government is legislated and 
permeates all local expenditure programmes.  For instance, section 309 of the 1996 Act  
compels urban councils to supply the Minister of Local Government any records he may 
require to discharge his duties.222   
Consistent with the modern trends of fiscally empowered sub-national units, the principle of 
subsidiarity needs to be reflected in the expenditure of urban councils.223 This is not the 
situation in Zimbabwe where the Minister of Local Government exercises control over urban 
councils through monitoring their expenditure patterns. In this regard, the Minister ensures 
that the budgets of urban councils manifest a skew in favour of capital development.224 
Consistent with national best practices, the Ministry of Local Government enforces the wage 
service bill ratio of 30% to 70%.225 The rationale is to release more funding for capital 
development. The net result is that urban councils are restricted from committing more than 
30% of their budgets on recurrent expenditures such as salaries.226  Furthermore, the Ministry 
emphasises the need for urban councils to conceive modest salaries in order to spur economic 
recovery. In addition, urban councils are urged to design and operationalise innovative 
                                                             
221 UNDP  2010: 6. 
222 Mushamba  2010: 114. 
223 UNDP  2010: 3. 
224 Ministry of Local Government  2010:2. 
225 Ministry of Local Government 2010: 2.-The 30% to 70% is a formula for managing the budgets of urban 
councils. It is used to release more resources towards capital development. According to the formula, 70% of the 
budgets should be funding going towards projects such as water supply, sewer works, road maintenance, street 
lighting, refuse removal and primary health care. Only 30% of budgeted funds should go towards salaries and 
other recurrent expenditures. Urban councils are compelled to demonstrate compliance with this requirement 
before the Minister of Local Government gazettes their tariffs. Thus it is a control tool in the hands of central 
government for monitoring the expenditure of urban councils. The idea (and quite a noble idea) is to prevent a 
situation where all revenue collected goes towards meeting the salary obligation. It prevents the creation of 
salary urban councils.  
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organisational structures that seek to reduce overhead costs.227 The general idea is to restrict 
the expenditure patterns of urban councils so that they do not have an adverse effect on the 
national economy.228 
The existence of central government controls on the usage of finances weakens the 
expenditure discretion of urban councils. The end result is that they are slow to endear 
themselves to the demands and preferences of residents.  Another disadvantage is that urban 
local authorities are left to battle service delivery backlogs and get blamed by residents for 
not being proactive. It would appear that the institutionalisation of financial controls is a well 
thought out central government strategy to rein in on the autonomy of urban councils, 
especially as it relates to their expenditure. The financial controls go to the core of the 
autonomy of urban local authorities and create a situation where the ability of urban councils 
to fulfil their mandates is paralysed.    
4.3 Borrowing 
Section 290 (1) of the 1996 Act sets out a framework within which urban councils may 
source for external funding for expenditure programmes. Urban local authorities are 
permitted to borrow in order to finance capital projects subject to restrictions set out in the 
Act. The capital projects for which they can borrow are: 
 the acquisition and construction of permanent works or undertakings;229 
 the acquisition of immovable property or any interest therein;230 
 the making of advances authorised by this or any other Act;231 
 the payment of compensation;232 
 the liquidation of the principal monies owing on account of any previous borrowings;233 
 the relief of general distress occasioned by some calamity in the council area;234 
 the acquisition of plant, equipment, vehicles and the like.235 
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Borrowing by urban councils for recurrent expenditure is not permitted. Section 290 of the 
1996 Act spells out criteria which all urban councils must meet before they are granted 
borrowing powers. The discretion to grant borrowing powers is the joint prerogative of the 
Ministers of Local Government and Finance.  
A council resolution must be in place before the borrowing power application is presented to 
the Minister of Local Government for his approval. The resolution to borrow the money must 
have been approved by the majority of the councillors in a full council meeting.236 The Mayor 
of an urban council must not have used his casting vote for the full council resolution on 
borrowing to be secured. The borrowing power application should state upfront the projects 
and amount of money to be borrowed237 and whether any objections raised by members of 
the public had been resolved. The application, which is then forwarded to the Minister of 
Local Government, must be accompanied by objections received from the public.238 The law 
authorises the Minister to use his discretion to approve part or the entire application for 
borrowing powers received.239 In addition, the 1996 Act grants authority to the Minister to set 
conditions and the period of validity of the borrowing powers.  
Urban councils can borrow funding from the State, the Local Authorities Pension Fund, a 
municipal provident fund, a municipal medical aid fund, sick fund and from another local 
authority.240  With the consent of the Ministers of Local Government and Finance, funding 
can be raised from the issue of stock, bonds, debentures and bills.241 Funds borrowed may not 
be used on other projects that deviate from those for which the borrowing power was 
processed. Short-term borrowing by means of a bank overdraft or short-term loans is 
permitted once the Minister of Local Government has approved the borrowing powers.242  
The regulation of sub-national borrowing entrenches the intrusive control of urban local 
authorities by central government. Although borrowing should be coordinated, central 
government should not impede urban councils’ reasonable access to other sources of revenue. 
                                                             
236 S 290 (2) (a) of the 1996 Act. 
237 S 290 (3) (a) (1) of the 1996 Act. 
238 S 290 (3) (d) of the 1996 Act. 
239  S 290 (4) of the 1996 Act. 
240 S 290 (5) (a) of the 1996 Act. 
241 S 290 (5) of the 1996 Act. 
242 S 291 of the 1996 Act. 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
Another issue raised is the importance of restricting borrowing to capital development. Yet 
another issue is the general displeasure expressed over central government subjugation of the 
rights of urban councils to borrow.   
4.4 Intergovernmental financial transfers 
The 1996 Act does not provide for intergovernmental transfers for urban local governments. 
As a result, the direct injection of annual central government funding can only take place at 
the discretion of central government. Similarly, the allocation process is masked in secrecy, 
giving legitimacy to claims that political considerations are at the centre of the disbursements. 
Although the intergovernmental financial transfers inject needed revenue, others have argued 
that the continued reliance of urban local governments on intergovernmental financial 
transfers entrenched dependence and subservience. Central government has availed funding 
equivalent to around 3% of the budgets of the cities of Harare and Bulawayo in 
intergovernmental financial transfers over the past ten years to assist the metropolitan cities 
overcome immense urbanisation challenges. Put in money terms, US$250 000 was injected as 
budgetary support. Much of the funding went towards renewal of urban infrastructure.243 
Specifically the funding went into the renewal of water supply and sewer infrastructure which 
had been overwhelmed by a situation caused by rural-urban migration dynamics.244 The 
grants were conditional. The funding was also decided by central government officials who 
determined the requirements of each urban council in the absence of a constitutionally 
protected formula. 
Central government grants to urban councils come in two forms; block grants and tied 
grants.245 Block grants are unconditional in that central government does not specify the use 
to which they are to be put except that the councils have to account for the use to central 
government. These grants are an important sources of finance for implementing projects 
identified by the villages and wards in the district. However, tied grants, as the name 
suggests, come with strings attached in that they have to be spent for specific services 
indicated by central government or its agencies. The grants were always tied to specific 
policy objectives which increased central government’s oversight. These grants are an 
important source of funds to finance services such as education, health, roads and 
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administration. Capacity to absorb these funds and to comply with central government 
criteria is important variables determining future disbursements.246  
Central government support for urban councils has been on a steady decline for the past two 
decades.247 The intergovernmental financial transfers began to decline with the worsening of the 
macro-economic conditions caused mainly by the flight of donors following the implementation 
of the land reform program. The decline of intergovernmental fiscal transfers is especially 
evident in what is usually referred to as public sector investment programs.  
 
In the late 1990s, the term Public Sector Investment Programme began to be used to denote 
government grants. The Public Sector Investment Programme was a conditional grant given to 
urban local authorities to assist them renew urban infrastructure.248 The grant was used in capital 
intensive projects such as expanding the sewer works of urban councils. These were capital 
intensive projects which the private financiers were reluctant to fund because the balance sheets 
of most urban local governments made them credit unworthy. Central government bureaucrats 
determined how much money was allocated to urban local authorities.249 In addition they came 
up with stringent conditions accompanying expenditure.250 The funding was discontinued three 
years ago because of funding challenges, with some projects abandoned before completion.251 
The table below illustrates the sharp decline in government support for capital expenditure 
programmes of urban councils: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
246 Zimbabwe Institute  2005: 20. 
247 Nhemachena and Matongo 2000: 6. 
 
248 Ministry of Local Government  2009: 7. 
249 Ministry of Local Government  2009: 2. 
250 Ministry of Local Government  2009: 3. 
251 For example, the budget for the City of Harare for 2010 does not make provision for government grants. It 
can be argued that this shows how skeptical urban councils have become about the ability of central government 
to support them through intergovernmental financial transfers. Instead, the budget makes reference to a loan of 
US$50 million, ironically obtainable from central government. In addition the city will be financed by a loan of 
US$12.97 million, obtainable from private financial institutions.  
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Table 1: The declining Public Sector Investment Program (1997-2000) 
Urban council Allocation 
1997/98            
(Z$) 
Allocation 
1999 
 (Z$) 
Allocation  
2000         
 (Z$) 
Bindura Municipality 16 025 000  9 759 000  3 600 000 
Bulawayo  City Council 67 255 000 21 229 000  9 009 000 
Chegutu Municipality 26 160 000  3 740 000  1 250 000 
Chinhoyi Municipality 28 040 000 27 520 000  5 500 000 
Chitungwiza Municipality 23 151 000 22 520 000  2 000 000 
Gwanda Municipality 10 930 000 4 670 000  1 500 000 
Gweru City Council 22 900 000 22 809 000 - 
Harare City Council 67 016 000 23 870 000  5 220 000 
Hwange Local Board  5 000 000  3 727 000  1 375 000 
Kadoma City Council 11 270 000 19 030 000  1 256 000 
Kariba Municipality 17 260 000 33 000 000 18 714 000 
Karoi Town Council 12 950 000  7 750 000  1 400 000 
KweKwe City Council 11 450 000 10 926 000  1 500 000 
Marondera Municipality 20 082 000 56 893 000 18 000 000 
Masvingo City Council 9 600 000 15 565 000  2 500 000 
Mutare City Council 22 920 000 47 736 000 11 637 000 
Norton Town Council 21 470 000 22 840 000  9 600 000 
Redcliff Municipality 25 610 000 18 000 000 11 185 000 
Rusape Town Council 12 039 000 12 125 000  1 600 000 
Ruwa Local Board -  2 500 000  2 000 000 
Shurugwi Town Council 8 835 000  8 765 000  1 600 000 
Victoria Falls Municipality 23 500 000 36 600 000 11 546 000 
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (2004: 5) 
The drastic reduction in intergovernmental financial transfers has not been accompanied by 
an increase in the revenue powers of urban councils. The net outcome is that urban councils 
now have nothing to replace the funding which is no longer coming their way. Much as this 
paralyses their operations, it also exposes them to a lot of unfunded mandates. The lack of 
constitutional or statutory standing for intergovernmental fiscal transfers in Zimbabwe 
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deprives urban councils of the legal basis for holding central government to account for 
neglecting its obligation to disburse equalising grants.     
5. Conclusion 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe does not recognise local government. Nor does it extend any 
form of autonomy, let alone fiscal autonomy to urban local authorities. Although the Act is 
the basis for the statutory powers of urban councils to raise revenue, central government 
regulation through the Minister of Local Government is a major constraining factor. The 
revenue raising powers of urban local authorities are under siege as they are subject to central 
government control and direction. The statutory powers assigned to the Minister of Local 
Government present serious challenges on the fiscal autonomy of urban local authorities.  
Urban local authorities enjoy restricted expenditure discretion. They are legally constrained 
to take autonomous decisions on matters of local finance without input from the Minister. 
The  Act  grants the Minister of Local Government excessive powers to regulate the funding 
arrangements of urban local governments. The Minister can set aside council decisions on 
financing arrangements even where they were influenced by a public consultation process. 
Urban Councils cannot exercise their full fiscal powers for fear of the oversight authority of 
the Minister of Local Government.   
The budgets of urban councils are subject to a regulatory framework set by central 
government, watering down the authority of urban councils to structure their budgets to meet 
local preferences. For instance every year budget guidelines are issued to all urban councils 
reminding them to draw up their budgets in accordance with the Standardised Accounting 
Budgeting System, Procedures and Policies Manuals. These are all documents developed by 
central government for purposes of budget standardisation and the pooling together of 
statistical data from urban councils. The freedom by urban local authorities to expend funding 
without recourse to central government is considerably constrained to the extent that their 
expenditure programmes have fiscal and monetary policy implications. This has rendered the 
budgets of urban councils no better than wish lists, raising queries on their credibility and 
reliability as a basis for financing expenditure. The existence of post-budget controls for 
urban councils is another practice which is at variance with good expenditure assignment.  
Urban councils in Zimbabwe are legally constrained in exercising their borrowing powers to 
source funding from lending institutions. The right to borrow is granted under the specific 
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condition that such borrowing be used for funding capital expenditure and not recurrent 
deficits. The position of this paper is that the regulation that all borrowing by urban local 
governments be subject to clearance by central government is contrary to the spirit of creating 
financially sound urban councils.  
Although the intergovernmental financial transfers are not provided for in the Act, their 
availability whenever central government can spare financial resources is making negative 
inroads into the institutional autonomy of urban councils. The use of conditional grants is 
increasingly associated with central government agendas to influence the pattern of 
expenditure of urban councils and assertion of control.  
A lot still needs to be done to ensure that urban councils are endowed with financial resources 
and authority that is consistent with their status. The absence of constitutionally protected 
intergovernmental financial transfers is ample demonstration of the lack of political 
commitment to the use of grants to equalise and enhance financial capacities of urban 
councils. Similarly, the increase in the conditional grants as opposed to unconditional grants 
dispensed to urban councils demonstrates central government’s dominance of local fiscal 
powers. The attachment of inflexible conditions to grants dispensed to urban councils is at 
variance with the tenets of good intergovernmental financial transfers.  To have impact, the 
four building blocks of fiscal decentralisation need to be viewed as an impeccable system that 
complements each other.  A lot still needs to be done to ensure that urban councils in 
Zimbabwe are fiscally empowered in order to fulfil their mandate. The next chapter 
summarises key study findings and offer few recommendations. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Introduction 
The study sought to establish how far Zimbabwe has gone in empowering urban communities 
by strengthening their urban councils and systems of sub-national government finances.  
After introducing the subject of fiscal decentralisation and identifying the building blocks of 
fiscal decentralisation the study proceeded to analyse legal provisions such as the Zimbabwe 
UCA and 1996 Act as they relate to the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by urban local governments. 
It first discussed the salient features of fiscal decentralisation for urban councils in Zimbabwe 
from a historical perspective.  It sought to achieve this objective by discussing, revenue, 
expenditure, intergovernmental fiscal transfers, and external funding in the context of local 
government financing policy from 1890 to 1996.  It then evaluated the fiscal autonomy 
enjoyed by urban councils in Zimbabwe within the framework of the 1996 Act. It tried to 
achieve this by analysing the legal framework for fiscal decentralisation for urban councils.  
It discussed the fiscal powers of urban councils, the legal framework for expenditure 
assignment, revenue assignment and borrowing by urban local authorities. The inter-
governmental financial transfers were discussed in the light of the current practice since the 
1996 Act does not provide for it.   
Chapter Five has two objectives. First, it restates the major findings of this study. Second, 
through recommendations, the study highlights the need for the Zimbabwe government to 
address the concerns of urban local governments for more fiscal autonomy.  
2. Conclusion 
In Zimbabwe, the decentralisation of major functions has not always been followed by a 
decentralisation of fiscal powers, resulting in unfunded mandates. The statutory framework 
for urban councils (the 1996 Act) assumes the form of delegation, where in practice fiscal 
autonomy is diminished by overriding national mandates, thereby rendering urban local 
authorities fiscally accountable to central government. The current alignment of functions and 
revenue sources is unsatisfactory in respect of both the amounts of revenue and the suitability 
of revenue sources in terms of local linkages. Zimbabwe’s current system of fiscal 
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decentralisation points to a steady increase in the centralisation of fiscal autonomy for urban 
councils. In relation to revenue, urban councils lack revenue autonomy.  
The mere provision of revenue powers in the 1996 Act has not sufficed. What has been 
shown is that urban local authorities lack revenue discretion.  Linked to the last observation is 
the question of sources of revenue assigned to urban councils that are not productive. In the 
absence of high yielding sources of revenue, urban councils have struggled with their service 
mandate. In addition, the revenue autonomy of urban local authorities to decide alternative 
financing options is restricted.  
One of the fundamentals coming from the study is that the expenditure discretion of urban 
councils is under blockade from centralising tendencies. The determination of urban council’s 
expenditure powers is a function which is subject to central government approval in 
Zimbabwe. Unless authorised by the Minister of Local Government, all expenditure is carried 
out within the framework of a hard budget. Some expenditure cannot be executed without the 
Minister’s approval. In some instances the Minister can suspend the expenditure powers of an 
urban council and instead direct expenditure processes. Although in legal terms, some 
expenditure authority has been devolved, the parameters prescribed by central government 
limit the exercise of such authority by urban councils. The net result is that urban local 
government expenditure authority becomes predominantly a delegated function. 
Another dimension with significant implications for urban councils relates to the failure of 
urban councils to exercise their right to borrow funds from lending institutions. Although 
there is statutory provision for sub-national borrowing, it cannot be exercised without the 
approval of central government. The right to borrow takes place at the behest of the Minister 
of Local Government. Entrenching centralising tendencies, the Minister of Local Government 
approves which institution an urban council should borrow from. In addition, the Minister has 
the final word on the size of the loan sought. The process for borrowing power application is 
often lambasted for being too burdensome.  
Generally, the absence of a clear policy on the grant system is a major reason contributing to 
the financial demise of urban local authorities in post independent Zimbabwe. In the absence 
of a constitutional instruction for dispensing grants, central government has adopted an adhoc 
approach to intergovernmental fiscal transfers. On the other hand, urban councils have no 
legal basis for challenging central government to honour its obligation.  
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The lack of a good framework for decentralisation does not fiscally support urban councils. 
First, the revenue powers of urban councils are subordinated through statutory provisions in 
the 1996 Act. Second, their expenditure discretion is ring fenced. Third, the statutory 
framework denies them unfettered right to borrowing. Fourth, intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers are dispensed at the whims of central government in the absence of constitutional 
and statutory instruction. The picture that emerges is of an urban council sector that is under 
heavy barricade from central government (see table 2).  
Table: 2: Theoretical and practical matrix of fiscal decentralisation of urban councils in    
Zimbabwe 
Theoretical Measure In Practice 
Is fiscal authority protected by the 
Constitution 
No 
Do urban councils have authority to 
determine rates and local taxes? 
Very limited authority 
Are  the majority of transfers formula-based 
and unconditional? 
No 
Are unconditional grants unrestricted No 
Are urban councils accountable for 
expenditure? 
Yes, 65% to central government, 35% to 
local constituents. 
Is there alignment between local expenditure 
responsibilities and own revenue capacity? 
No 
Are urban councils reliant on 
intergovernmental financial transfers? 
Yes, but these are erratic and not 
constitutional or statutory.  
Do urban councils have autonomy to 
determine tariffs 
No 
Do urban councils have autonomous 
borrowing powers? 
No 
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3. Recommendations 
An enabling environment for fiscal decentralisation in Zimbabwe should begin with 
constitutional or legal mandates for some minimum level of autonomy, rights and 
responsibilities for urban local authorities. There is need to develop robust and clearly 
defined constitutional and legal provisions to support fiscal decentralisation and the 
strengthening of urban local governments. In addition, the existence and objectives of urban 
councils should be incorporated into the Constitution, on the grounds that urban local 
authority is an essential component of the overall system of government in Zimbabwe. The 
constitutional imperatives of fiscal decentralisation should accord considerable detail to the 
revenue powers of urban councils. The constitutional review process currently underway in 
Zimbabwe provides an opportune platform to constitutionally entrench urban councils and 
encode fiscal powers thereof.  
Equally, urban local authorities should have access to sufficient revenue to enable them to 
provide all the services for which they are responsible at a standard which is acceptable. They 
should have sufficient revenue raising powers to obtain most of the funds needed to render 
service from their own resources. This may be achieved through a combination of the 
following: (1) creation of new revenue raising powers; (2) transfer of some existing central 
government raising powers to urban local authorities and (3) sharing of some of the existing 
revenue raised by central government with urban councils. Local finances should be placed 
on an assured basis instead of being dependent on a year-by-year central government 
decisions. 
There is need for a constitutional protection of the expenditure powers of urban councils 
given the disproportionate powers which the Minister of Local Government wields over the 
expenditure discretion of urban councils. At present, some of the expenditure powers of 
urban local authorities are executed at the behest of the Minister of Local Government.  In the 
spirit of fiscally empowering sub-national entities, urban local authorities need to be accorded 
greater expenditure autonomy. Central government must avail financial resources to cover the 
costs incurred by urban local authorities in complying with certain requirements under central 
government statutes, regulations and policies.   
In order to fiscally empower urban local governments, a constitutional framework should 
give instruction to the fair allocation of nationally generated revenue. Such an arrangement 
should dispense with the present discretionary disbursement process which does not afford 
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urban councils entitlement to nationally raised revenue. Revenue sharing can only be assured 
if it is grounded in the Constitution. To ensure equity, transparency and accountability, the 
revenue share needs to be based on an objective formula. The grants dispensed should be 
based on an agreed formula, which takes account of the variations in revenue raising capacity 
between urban councils. The intergovernmental financial transfers should provide cover for 
urban local government fiscal imbalances, supplementing inadequate local own-source 
revenues to improve the ability of urban councils to meet their expenditure.  The transfer 
process should be clear and transparent so that urban councils are able to trace their transfer 
receipts to the national budget provisions.  
There should be no doubt as to whether or not an intergovernmental fiscal transfer will be 
received in any budget period. The idea is to allow urban councils to make appropriate plans 
linking expenditure plans to revenue streams. The mechanism should be fair in respect of the 
amount of the share that urban local authorities are entitled to. Financial transfers from 
central government to urban councils (including the transfer of funds provided by foreign 
donors or other external agencies) should be made from the Ministry of Finance to the urban 
local authorities without passing through line Ministries responsible for the relevant sectors. 
The disproportionate powers which the  Minister of Local Government wields over sub-
national borrowing for urban councils should be rationalised so as to accord urban councils  
rights to unfettered borrowing. It is recommended that the legal cornerstone of borrowing, 
section 290 of the 1996 Act, be reviewed and replaced by a legal provision which does not 
subordinate the rights of urban councils to borrow. It is further suggested that the successor 
legal dispensation to section 290 of the 1996 Act should prescribe a facilitative role for  the 
said Minister. In relationship to sub-national borrowing, it would be better if the facilitative 
role of central government as well as the fiscal discretion of urban councils were enshrined in 
the Act. 
The search for a new constitutional order which is currently underway in Zimbabwe needs to 
create a local government financing system which is sustainable and one which affirms the 
fact that the services which urban local authorities provide are prerequisites for local and 
national economic development. In particular, the new constitutional order should 
permanently settle the issue of local government autonomy. Although this paper has outlined 
areas which legislative reforms could focus on, the need for further research and debate on 
these areas cannot be overemphasised. 
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